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BY  MOST RECKONINGS CORPORATE PROFITS have taken a dive since 1966. 
The share of corporate profits (including the inventory valuation adjust- 
ment, or IVA) in the gross national product fell from 11.0 percent in 1966 
to a postwar low of 7.1 percent in 1970. In the recent expansion, the share 
has rebounded only to  8.5 percent of GNP  during the profits boom  of 
1973.1 Even with the "breathtaking"  profits predicted for  oil companies 
during 1974, the share is expected to decline to 8.1 percent.2  The poor per- 
formance of corporate profits is not limited to the United States. A secular 
decline in the share of profits has also occurred  in most of Western Europe. 
The complete record of the profit share is shown in Figure 1. By either 
measure depicted there-all  corporate profits (plus IVA) as a share of GNP 
or the share of profits (plus IVA) in nonfinancial corporate product-the 
share has dropped considerably over the period; the  1971-73 ratio was 
57 percent of the 1948-50 average. The postwar decline actually occurred 
in two distinct movements, 1948-54 and 1966-70, separated by a period 
Note: This work  was performed  in part  with the help of the National  Science  Founda- 
tion and the Ford Foundation.  I am grateful  for the comments  of Wynne Godley and 
members  of the Brookings  panel. None of them is responsible  for the views expressed 
here. 
1. All calculations  were performed  on the mighty  TROLL system. With exceptions 
noted below, all data are taken  from the data bank of the National Bureau  of Economic 
Research. 
2. See Walter W. Heller and George L. Perry, "The U.S. Economic Outlook for 
1974,"  Newsletter  of National City Bank of Minneapolis,  January  8, 1974. 
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Figure 1.  Share of Profits in Gross National Product and in Gross 
Corporate  Product of Nonfinancial  Corporations,  1948-73 
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Source: Official U.S. Department of Commerce data from the data bank of the National Bureau of Eco 
nomic Research. 
during which the share fluctuated within a narrow band, mostly because of 
cyclical movements. Since 1970, the share has recovered somewhat. 
The behavior of corporate profits has been a puzzle to many observers. 
Okun and Perry tended to  discount the fall, attributing it to  the unex- 
pectedly large increase in labor's share from 1966 to  1969. They laid this 
increase partly to an abnormal rise in the real wage in 1968 but mainly to 
the productivity sag from 1966 to  1969.3 R. J. Gordon's recent paper on 
price behavior also indicates a substantial decline in the markup of prices 
over unit labor costs in the late 1960s.4 
What lies behind the crumbling of profit margins since 1966? Is the de- 
cline a statistical artifact?  Was labor able to increase its share by aggressive 
bargaining? Or does the declining share of profits portend the euthanasia 
of the caDitalist  class, and indeed of capitalism itself? 
3. Arthur M. Okun and George L. Perry, "Notes and Numbers on the Profits 
Squeeze,"  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity  (3:1970), pp. 471-72. Hereafter  this 
document  will be referred  to as BPEA, followed by the date. 
4. Robert  J. Gordon, "Wage-Price  Controls  and the Shifting  Phillips  Curve,"  BPEA 
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A Closer  Look  at the Concepts 
An attempt to explain the movement in profits requires,  first, some atten- 
tion to problems in the data. The raw movements in corporate profits may 
be a misleading indicator of underlying trends in profitability because of 
changes (1) in accounting conventions and depreciation provisions, (2) in 
the financial structure  of corporations, (3) in the burden of corporate taxa- 
tion, and (4) in the price level. The following sections recount the adjust- 
ments I made to the data on profits for each of these factors in an effort to 
obtain a more accurate measure of the return on corporate capital and its 
share of output. All data and analyses refer to the nonfinancial corporate 
sector. 
The first correction takes account of the difference between economic 
depreciation and depreciation allowable for tax purposes. The official def- 
inition of profits subtracts the tax-allowable depreciation in  calculating 
profits. This convention poses two separate problems. First, part of  the 
changes in corporate depreciation merely reflects changes in the tax law in 
1954, 1962, 1969, and 1971. Second, for tax purposes depreciation is taken 
on book value rather  than replacement cost and thus generally understates 
economic depreciation. In order to calculate economic depreciation, I have 
adjusted tax-allowable depreciation for these two components. The results 
are shown in Table 1. 
The total depreciation adjustment, shown in column (4), is very signifi- 
cant during the early years, a period in which rising prices meant that de- 
preciation covered barely two-thirds of replacement needs. Later, the gap 
narrowed; and after the  1962 reforms, allowances actually became too 
generous. By  1969, however, the inflation had accelerated so much that 
even the liberalized depreciation guidelines were insufficient to make up 
the lag between book value and replacement cost. In 1973, it is estimated, 
profits were actually overstated by 3 percent because of the depreciation 
conventions. 
The second adjustment deals with the considerable shift in the structure 
of returns to capital over the postwar period. The ratio of  interest pay- 
ments to corporate profits and IVA rose from 3 percent in 1948 to 24 per- 
cent in 1973. In part, this change reflected the expanded share of debt in 
corporate securities,5  in part, the increase of nominal (but not real) interest 
5. The ratio of net debt to the replacement  cost of tangible assets for nonfinancial 
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Table  1.  Adjustment of Depreciation  Allowances  of Nonfinancial 
Corporations  for Changes  in Tax  Laws  and in Prices,  1948-73 
Billions of dollars 
Depreciation  adjustment 
Capital 
consumption  Change  in  Change  in  Economic 
allowance  tax laws  price level  Total  depreciationa 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1948  6.9  0.1  -3.5  -3.4  10.3 
1949  7.8  -0.1  -3.4  -3.5  11.3 
1950  8.6  -0.4  -3.6  -4.0  12.6 
1951  10.1  -0.2  -4.4  -4.6  14.7 
1952  11.3  0.0  -4.6  -4.6  15.9 
1953  12.9  0.6  -4.3  -3.7  16.6 
1954  14.7  1.5  -4.1  -2.6  17.3 
1955  17.1  2.7  -4.2  -1.5  18.6 
1956  18.5  2.9  -5.1  -2.2  20.7 
1957  20.4  3.3  -5.7  -2.4  22.8 
1958  21.5  3.2  -5.6  -2.4  23.9 
1959  23.0  3.5  -5.5  -2.0  25.0 
1960  24.3  3.4  -5.1  -1.7  26.0 
1961  25.6  3.1  -4.5  -1.4  27.0 
1962  29.3  5.3  -4.1  1.2  28.2 
1963  31.0  5.2  -3.7  1.5  29.5 
1964  32.9  5.2  -3.5  1.7  31.2 
1965  35.4  5.7  -3.8  1.9  33.5 
1966  38.4  5.9  -4.2  1.7  36.7 
1967  41.7  6.0  -4.8  1.2  40.5 
1968  45.1  6.3  -5.4  0.9  44.2 
1969  49.5  7.4  -7.8  -0.4  49.9 
1970  53.2  7.6  -9.1  -1.5  54.7 
1971  58.1  8.2  -10.1  -1.9  60.0 
1972  63.2  9.4  -11.4  -2.0  65.2 
1973  68.3  10.2  -12.5  -2.3  70.6 
Sources: Column (1) is from U.S.  Office of Business Economics, The National Inicome  and Product Ac- 
counts of the United States, 1929-1965: Statistical Tables (1966), Table 1.14, line 18, and Survey of Current 
Business, relevant 1971-74 issues, Table 1.14. 
Column (4) through 1971 and column (5) through 1967 are from John A. Gorman, "Nonfinancial Cor- 
porations: New Measures  of Output and Input," Survey  of Current  Businiess,  Vol. 52 (March 1972), Table 1, 
pp. 22-23. Later data were made available by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. To break down the 
total depreciation  adjustment  into that due to tax laws (2) and that due to the difference  between book value 
and replacement cost (3), I used estimates from Allan H.  Young,  "Alternative Estimates of Corporate 
Depreciation and Profits: Part II," Survey of Current  Business, Vol. 48 (May  1968), Table 4, pp. 22-23, 
lines 1 and 7 for 1948-64. Figures for 1965 to 1973 were made available by BEA. Column (3) is the residual 
and thus is more subject to error than other figures. Note that column (5) is the difference  between  columns 
(1) and (4). 
a.  Calculated as 85 percent of service lifetimes in U.S. Treasury  Department, Bulletin "F" (rev., 1942), 
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rates on corporate debt over the postwar period. Some reasons for these 
movements will be outlined below; suffice  it to say here that they appear to 
be a rational response to changes in the tax system and to inflation. Under 
these circumstances the appropriate  variable is the total share of property 
income, rather  than profits  alone. In what follows, then, I will examine total 
capital income-the  sum of corporate profits and interest. 
A third factor affecting corporate income over the postwar period was 
a wide variety of changes in taxation. The tax burden on corporate capital 
income reached a peak during the Korean War, with an average of 58 per- 
cent. The tax burden declined slowly, influenced by a number of legislative 
measures-liberalized  depreciation, the investment tax credit, a drop in the 
corporation tax rate-as  well as by economic forces-a  lower rate of infla- 
tion and a higher debt-equity ratio. By the mid-1960s the effective rate was 
down to  39 percent; put differently, because of liberalized taxation the 
take-home pay of corporations-profits  after corporation taxes-rose  by 
45 percent for every dollar earned. 
How does a changing tax structure  affect corporate behavior? This is one 
of the big unsettled questions of economics. Some economists feel that an 
altered tax on profits results in little shifting, at least in the short run; others 
argue that complete long-run shifting is a basic theorem of economic analy- 
sis. In any case, capital's take-home pay seems the best concept for explor- 
ing what has happened to profits' share over any extended period. 
Table 2 collects these first three corrections to calculate "genuine capital 
income." This is the best estimate I can make of the after-tax earnings of 
capital, defined to include interest and a more satisfactory measure of eco- 
nomic depreciation. 
The fourth problem in considering corporation profits is the effect of 
movements in the price level. As the halcyon days of stable prices recede 
into memory, many accountants and businessmen are addressing  the prob- 
lem of designing accounting principles for an inflationary economy. The 
necessary distinction for this purpose is the difference between "genuine" 
profits and "nominal"  profits. Nominal profits are total returns  to corpora- 
tions, part of which-accrued  capital gains on fixed capital and inventories 
-are  owed mainly to the rise in the general price level and are therefore 
excluded from corporate returns in calculating genuine income. 
The businessman's concept of income-or  "book profits"-lies  some- 
where between genuine and nominal income. At this time, most business 
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Table  2. Estimates  of Genuine  Capital  Income  Earned  by Nonfinancial 
Corporate  Capital,  1948-73 
Billions of dollars 
Corporate 
profits  Capital 
(before  income  Corporate  Genuine 
taxes) and  Depreciationz  Net  before  capital  capital 
IVAa  adjustment  interest  taxes  taxes  income 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1948  29.6  -3.4  0.9  27.1  11.9  15.2 
1949  26.8  -3.5  1.0  24.3  9.5  14.8 
1950  33.5  -4.0  0.9  30.4  16.7  13.7 
1951  37.9  -4.6  1.1  34.4  21.0  13.4 
1952  34.7  -4.6  1.2  31.3  17.8  13.5 
1953  33.9  -3.7  1.3  31.5  18.5  13.0 
1954  31.8  -2.6  1.6  30.8  15.7  15.1 
1955  40.3  -1.5  1.6  40.4  19.8  20.6 
1956  39.1  -2.2  1.7  38.6  19.8  18.8 
1957  38.3  -2.4  2.2  38.1  18.9  19.2 
1958  33.5  -2.4  2.7  33.8  16.3  17.5 
1959  42.8  -2.0  2.7  43.5  20.8  22.7 
1960  40.3  -1.7  3.0  41.6  19.5  22.1 
1961  40.3  -1.4  3.5  42.4  19.8  22.6 
1962  45.0  1.2  4.1  50.3  20.9  29.4 
1963  48.6  1.5  4.5  54.6  22.9  31.7 
1964  55.2  1.7  5.1  62.0  24.3  37.7 
1965  64.1  1.9  6.0  72.0  27.6  44.4 
1966  69.4  1.7  7.3  78.4  30.1  48.3 
1967  65.1  1.2  9.0  75.3  28.4  46.9 
1968  70.4  0.9  10.5  81.8  34.7  47.1 
1969  62.1  -0.4  12.9  74.6  33.4  41.2 
1970  50.7  -1.5  15.0  64.2  26.9  37.3 
1971  59.2  -1.9  16.5  73.8  29.7  44.1 
1972  67.3  -2.0  17.4  82.7  35.0  47.7 
1973  79.3  -2.3  18.8  95.8  46.6  49.2 
Sources: Capital income includes interest and profits but subtracts the adjustment for depreciation. Col 
umns (1), (3), and (5) are from National Income anid  Product  Accounts, Table 1.14, lines 25, 24, 27, respec- 
tively, and Survey of Current  Business, relevant 1971-74 issues, Table 1.14. Column (2) is from Table 1. 
Column (4) is the sum of columns (1), (2), and (3). Column (6) is column (4) minus column (5). 
a. Inventory valuation adjustment. 
and fixed  capital  at historical  cost. This means  that "book"  corporate  in- 
come  represents  genuine  income  plus  realized  capital  gains.  The  Commerce 
Department's  treatment  is a hodgepodge-removing  realized  capital  gains 
on inventories,  but leaving  the book treatment  on fixed  capital.  Thus  only William  D. Nordhaus  175 
part of the difference  between book and genuine income is removed by the 
IVA, while the depreciation adjustment removes the remainder. 
For purposes of comparison, it is possible to estimate nominal returns 
to corporate capital. Nominal  returns, which are analogous to  nominal 
interest on bonds or savings accounts, include not only genuine profits, 
but also accrued capital gains on inventory and fixed capital. These capital 
gains take two forms: first, the restoration of the IVA, as a realized gain on 
inventories;  second, the accrued capital gains on corporate capital resulting 
from a rise in replacement  cost. These nominal capital gains are something 
of an accounting fiction (as, of course, are all accounting concepts), since 
most  of  the assets that give rise to  them cannot be  readily liquidated. 
Nevertheless, if capital markets were perfect and if good markets for used 
capital existed, the nominal gain could be realized any old time a corpora- 
tion wanted it. Table 3, which traces the adjustment  from genuine to nomi- 
nal returns, reveals the sizable capital gains by corporations-averaging 
about $35 billion-over  the last five years. Remember, however, that most 
of the accrued  capital gains experienced  by corporations do not correspond 
to any real income. If all prices double, the firm will have accrued capital 
gains equal to  the  original value  of  capital, but  no  real variables will 
change: it can still pay only the same real dividends, buy the same amount 
of real investment, and so forth. 
On the other hand, prices do not always move together; capital and con- 
sumer prices diverge both cyclically and secularly. To the extent that prices 
of capital goods rise faster than those of consumer goods, the firms have 
experienced  real capital gains. If the real capital gains are added to genuine 
income, the result is the Haig-Simons concept of comprehensive income.6 
Over the postwar period as a whole, capital gains barely exceeded needs 
simply to maintain real income. Thus nominal income averaged 145 percent 
of genuine income; but if nominal income is reduced by the capital gains 
necessary to maintain the real value of capital in terms of consumption, it 
represents  only 115 percent of genuine income. 
What is the effect of inflation on genuine capital income? Consider a sit- 
uation of stable prices, with a zero depreciation adjustment, and with cor- 
porations earning 10 percent before tax on an inventory stock of $200 bil- 
lion and fixed capital of $800 billion. Assume lifetimes for inventories and 
6. See Henry C. Simons, Personal  Income  Taxation:  The Definition  of Income  as a 
Problem  of Fiscal  Policy (University  of Chicago  Press, 1938), Chap. 2. 176  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
Table  3. Calculations  of Genuine  and  Nominal  Income  Earned  on 
Nonfinancial  Corporate  Capital,  1948-73 
Bilions of dollars 
Genuinie  Capital  gain  Capital  gain  Nominial 
capital  adjustment  on net  capital 
income  after  for inventories  capital  inicome  after 
taxes  (minus  IVA)  stock  taxes 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1948  15.2  2.2  13.6  31.0 
1949  14.8  -1.9  4.7  17.6 
1950  13.7  5.0  2.2  20.9 
1951  13.4  1.2  11.0  25.6 
1952  13.5  -1.0  7.0  19.5 
1953  13.0  1.0  1.9  15.9 
1954  15.1  0.3  1.8  17.2 
1955  20.6  1.7  4.7  27.0 
1956  18.8  2.7  10.3  31.8 
1957  19.2  1.5  10.0  30.7 
1958  17.5  0.3  5.3  23.1 
1959  22.7  0.5  2.7  25.9 
1960  22.1  -0.2  1.5  23.4 
1961  22.6  0.1  0.6  23.3 
1962  29.4  -0.3  1.9  31.0 
1963  31.7  0.5  2.1  34.3 
1964  37.7  0.4  3.1  41.2 
1965  44.4  1.5  5.5  51.4 
1966  48.3  1.7  10.3  60.3 
1967  46.9  1.1  14.2  62.2 
1968  47.1  3.3  14.9  65.3 
1969  41.2  5.5  24.8  71.5 
1970  37.3  4.5  30.9  72.7 
1971  44.1  4.9  27.0  76.0 
1972  47.7  6.9  33.1  87.7 
1973  49.1  17.3  26.2  92.6 
Sources: Capital income includes interest and profits but excludes an allowance for depreciation. Gen- 
uine capital income excludes capital gains, while nominal capital income includes capital gains. Column (1) 
is from Table 2; column (2) is from Nationzal  Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.14, line 31, and Survey 
of Current  Business,  relevant 1971-74 issues, Table 1.14. Column (3) is derived  from Gorman, "Nonfinancial 
Corporations," Table 1. Column (4) = colunis  (1) +  (2) +  (3). Data for  1973 were made available by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
fixed  capital  of one year  and ten years,  respectively;  no debt; no produc- 
tivity  change;  and a tax rate of 50 percent. 
Now suppose  all prices  and wages  start  rising  at a 5 percent  rate.  At the 
end of the first  year,  before-tax  genuine  profits  will have  risen  to 105.  The William  D. Nordhaus  177 
IVA will be -10  and the depreciation adjustment  4, so book profits would 
increase to  119-a  rise of almost 20 percent rather than 5 percent. 
After-tax genuine profits behave differently.  Since the IVA and deprecia- 
tion adjustment  are taxed at full rates, genuine profits after tax fall by 9 per- 
cent from 50 to 45.5, or by 13 percent to 43.3 in first-period  prices. If long- 
term debt is added, the result is qualitatively the same. The incremental 
book profits are taxed at full rates and genuine profits show a decline. The 
fact that interest is not taxed will tend to  cushion the drop in genuine 
profits. Thus an inflationary  economy displays robust book profits, which 
climb roughly twice as rapidly as the inflation rate, while after-tax genuine 
profits decline sharply. This divergence  will remain until the before-tax rate 
of return rises enough to offset the effects of the inflation; in the example, 
it would have to rise from 10 to 11.5 percent. 
These accounting problems raise the question of whether it would be 
preferable to accelerate the trend toward use of replacement cost as the 
preferred  method of accounting. Such a move would help reduce the ef- 
fects inflation and other shocks have on both national and business ac- 
counts. Did Congress really intend to impose a higher effective corporate 
tax rate in inflationary  years?  Even more important is the fact that inflation 
enhances the advantage of debt finance. Serious consideration should be 
given to  rendering both  corporate accounting and tax treatment more 
immune to variations in the inflation rate. 
RETURN  TO  CAPITAL 
The foregoing adjustments to the data on corporate profits now permit 
an examination of the movement in the return to capital over the postwar 
period. For this purpose we will present two alternative  concepts: the share 
of  capital income in total  corporate income and the rate of  return on 
corporate capital. 
Table 4 and Figure 2 show the movements in the share of capital income 
in total corporate income. In the figure, the curve labeled SGEN  is the share 
of genuine capital income in corporate income. The numerator of SGEN is 
simply genuine capital income as shown in column (1) of Table 3. The 
denominator is  net  income  accruing to  corporations-gross  corporate 
product less taxes and capital consumption; it is the equivalent of national 178  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
Table 4.  After-Tax Share of Genuine  and Nominal Capital Income 
in Total Nonfinancial  Corporate  Income, 1948-73 
Percent 
Year  Genuine  share  Nominal  share 
1948  14.3  25.4 
1949  14.3  16.5 
1950  12.2  17.5 
1951  10.5  18.3 
1952  9.9  13.7 
1953  8.8  10.6 
1954  10.3  11.5 
1955  12.5  15.7 
1956  10.6  16.8 
1957  10.3  15.6 
1958  9.6  12.4 
1959  11.2  12.6 
1960  10.5  11.0 
1961  10.5  10.9 
1962  12.5  13.1 
1963  12.8  13.7 
1964  14.7  15.8 
1965  14.4  16.3 
1966  15.6  18.8 
1967  14.5  18.4 
1968  13.5  17.8 
1969  11.1  17.8 
1970  9.7  17.3 
1971  10.8  17.2 
1972  10.6  17.9 
1973  9.8  17.0 
Source: The genuine share is genuine capital income from Table 3, divided by  genuine capital income 
plus compensation of employees (from sources cited in Table 2). The nominal share is nominal  capital 
income from Table 3 divided by nominal capital income plus compensation of employees. 
income less profits taxes and less the depreciation adjustment. Put another 
way, it is genuine capital income plus compensation of employees.7 
7. The subtraction  of profits  taxes  is a result  of my presumption  that profits  taxes are 
eventually  shifted. The U.S. national income accounts exclude  indirect business taxes 
from national  income but include  profits  taxes because  of the presumption  that indirect 
business  taxes are shifted  while profits  taxes are not. Some analogous  assumptions  need 
to be made about labor taxes, especially  social security  and other payroll taxes. Most 
economists presumably  would be more comfortable  with the assumption  that general 
payroll taxes are not shifted than with the assumption  that corporation  income taxes 
are not. William D. Nordhaus  179 
Figure  2. After-Tax  Share  of Genuine  and  Nominal  Capital  Income  in 
Total  Nonfinancial  Corporate  Income,  1948-73 
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Source: Table 4. 
The second concept shown in Table 4 and Figure 2, SNOM,  is the share of 
nominal capital income in nominal net income accruing to corporations. 
In practice, SNOM  results from adding capital gains-shown  in columns (2) 
and (3) of Table 3-to  both the numerator and the denominator of SGEN. 
A second measure of the return to capital, shown in Table 5 and Figure 
3, is the net rate of return on corporate capital. For comparison, Table 5 
shows both  before- and  after-tax rates of  return on  corporate capital, 
defined as the ratio of income to the value of the physical capital stock in 
corporations. The income concepts are the same as those shown in Table 3. 
For the value of the capital stock, I have used Department of Commerce 
estimates of the replacement cost of corporate capital.8 
8. John A. Gorman,  "Nonfinancial  Corporations:  New Measures  of Output and In- 
put," Survey  of Current  Business,  Vol. 52 (March 1972), pp. 26-27, Table 4. Gorman's 
data use lifetimes  that are 85 percent  of those of the U.S. Treasury  Department's  Bulle- 
tin "F" (rev., 1942), and include a correction  for government-owned  assets. Unfortu- 
nately, the capital data exclude  land because of the poor quality of data on corporate 
land holdings.  The significance  of this is discussed  below. 180  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
Table  5.  Genuine and Nominal  Rates  of Return on Nonfinancial 
Corporate  Capital,  and Tax  Rates,  1948-73 
Percent  per year 
Tax rate on corporate 
Genuine  rate of return  Nominal  rate of return  income 
Before  After  Before  After  Genuine  Nominial 
Year  tax (ri)  tax (r2)  tax (r3)  tax (r4)  income  income 
1948  17.3  9.7  27.4  19.8  43.9  27.7 
1949  14.5  8.8  16.2  10.5  39.3  34.9 
1950  16.7  7.5  20.6  11.5  55.1  44.2 
1951  16.5  6.4  22.4  12.3  61.2  45.1 
1952  13.8  6.0  16.5  8.6  56.5  47.9 
1953  13.3  5.5  14.5  6.7  58.7  53.8 
1954  12.5  6.2  13.4  7.0  50.4  47.8 
1955  15.5  7.9  18.0  10.4  49.0  42.2 
1956  13.4  6.5  18.2  11.1  51.4  39.0 
1957  12.2  6.1  15.9  9.8  50.0  38.4 
1958  10.4  5.4  12.1  7.1  48.1  41.3 
1959  13.0  6.8  13.9  7.7  47.7  44.6 
1960  12.0  6.3  12.3  6.7  47.5  44.5 
1961  11.8  6.3  12.0  6.5  46.6  45.8 
1962  13.5  7.9  13.9  8.3  41.5  40.3 
1963  14.0  8.1  14.6  8.8  42.1  39.7 
1964  15.0  9.1  15.9  10.0  39.3  37.1 
1965  16.3  10.0  17.8  11.6  38.7  34.8 
1966  16.1  9.9  18.6  12.4  38.5  33.3 
1967  14.0  8.8  16.9  11.6  37.1  31.4 
1968  14.0  8.1  17.2  11.2  42.1  34.9 
1969  11.6  6.4  16.3  11.1  44.8  31.9 
1970  9.1  5.3  14.1  10.3  41.8  26.9 
1971  9.6  5.7  13.8  10.0  40.6  27.5 
1972  9.9  5.6  14.7  10.5  43.4  28.6 
1973  10.5  5.4  15.3  10.2  48.6  33.3 
Sources: The genuine rate of return  is the genuine capital income divided by the net stock of capital, while 
the nominal return is nominal capital income divided by the net stock of capital. All values are undeflated. 
The denominator for all calculations is the net stocks of all nonfinancial corporate capital, including an 
adjustment for  valuation of  government surplus assets, in current prices; the data are from  Gorman, 
"Nonfinancial Corporations," Table 3. 
The numerators  are as follows: r1 is Table 3, column (1), plus profits tax liabilities, from Table 2, column 
(5); r2 is Table 3, column (1); r3 is Table 3, column (4), plus profits tax liabilities; r4 is Table 3, column (4). 
The rates of return depicted in Figure 3 give the same basic impression 
as the share data in Figure 2. In terms of genuine income, one and one-half 
cycles appear over the period. Both the share and rate of return trace a 
definite downtrend from 1948 to  the middle 1950s; a dramatic recovery William D. Nordhaus  181 
Figure 3.  Genuine  and Nominal After-Tax Rates of Return  on 
Nonfinancial  Corporate  Capital, 1948-73 
Percent  per year 
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from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, with a peak in 1965 or 1966; and a 
deterioration to a plateau by 1970. 
Nominal shares and nominal rates of return present a more complicated 
pattern.  Roughly  speaking,  the  nominal  rate  of  return  is the  genuine  rate 
of return plus the rate of inflation.  This means  that nominal  rates of return 
lie significantly above genuine rates in the early postwar period and from 
the late 1960s  to the present.  Ignoring  1948,  the nominal  rates of return 
actually  held up in the period  after 1965-66  better  than they had at any 
comparable  interval  in the postwar  era. 
A final  subplot  in the tale is outl  ialn  the last two columns  of Table  5r 
which give the tax rates on genuine  and nominal  versions  of corporate 
capital  income.  They demonstrate  dramaticaly  the  erosion  of the effective 
corporate  to  tefrom the early 1950s  to the mid-1960s  by the many 
changes  in tax structure.  From the high point of 61 percent  in 1951,  the 
average  effective  tax rate on genuine  income  dropped  24 points  to its low 
in 1967.  Part  of the reason  was  lower  statutory  rates,  but  just as important 
were  the combined  effects  of the investment  tax credit,  liberalized  depre- 182  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
ciation  guidelines,  and the shift in financial  structure  toward  interest  pay- 
ments. The drop in the tax of nominal capital income was even more 
dramatic-from  54 percent  in 1953  to 27 percent  in 1970.  One peculiarity 
of the series,  the big  jump  in tax rates  in 1973,  is due solely  to the fact that 
1973's  huge  capital  gains  on inventories  (that  is, the IVA) are  taxed at the 
full corporate  tax rate. 
Up to this point all data  have  concerned  the rate of return  on total cap- 
ital, without  explicitly  accounting  for corporate  holdings of land. Since 
probably  at least some part of corporate  profits  is a return  on land hold- 
ings, a rough  calculation  seems  desirable. 
The latest comprehensive  balance sheet for corporations  covers the 
period  from 1952  to 1968.9  According  to this study,  the ratio  of land  hold- 
ings to total reproducible  tangibles  (all valued  at replacement  cost) rose 
from 8.1 percent  in 1952,  to 14.3 percent  in 1960,  and to 15.7 percent  in 
1968.  Real capital  gains (that is, the differential  movement  between  land 
prices and consumer  prices)  averaged  10.3  and 3.0 percent  annually  over 
the subperiods  1952-60 and 1960-68, respectively.  Adding real capital 
gains  on land  to genuine  profits,  and replacement  cost of land to the value 
of capital, yields the following figures  for genuine rates of return to 
tangibles  (all expressed  in percent): 
Land as a  After-tax  After-tax 
share of all  genuine return  genuine return 
Period  tangibles  to capital  to tangibles 
1952-60  11.2  6.3  6.7 
1960-68  15.1  8.5  7.7 
1952-68  13.1  7.4  7.2 
These  figures  indicate  that the exclusion  of land makes  little difference  to 
the estimation  of rates  of return  over  the period  as a whole;  the total was 
overestimated  by 0.2 percentage  point. If the data are at all accurate,  the 
overstatement  in the second  half of the period  was more serious  than the 
understatement  in the first. 
Perspectives  on Profits 
So much  for the facts. I turn  now to a discussion  of various  theoretical 
explanations  of the postwar  movements  in corporate  profits.  The explana- 
tions fall naturally  into two groups:  short-run  and long-run  theories. 
9. Institutional  Investor  Study  Report  of the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission,  Sup- 
plementary Volume I, H. Doc.  92-64, Pt. 6, 92 Cong.  1 sess. (1971), p. 312. William  D. Nordhaus  183 
The short-run  explanations  of profits  are the counterpart  of modern 
theories  about  short-run  pricing  and productivity  in the industrial  sector. 
The first  question,  then, is the adequacy  of these theories  for explaining 
profits. 
The question  of the short-run  behavior  of prices  and profits  shades  off 
naturally  into long-run  theories  of the investment  decision  and  profitability 
on capital.  Modern  price theories-with their emphasis  on a fixed, arbi- 
trary  markup  on labor  or,  more  generally,  on current  costs-cannot explain 
how  the  markup  is determined  and  when  and  how it changes.  We therefore 
turn  in a second  section  to the long-run  theories  of profits. 
SHORT-RUN  THEORIES 
Given  technology  and the capital  stock,  the level of demand,  and  wages, 
there  is an accounting  identity  relating  profits  and prices: 
(1)  l  = pX-wL, 
where  II is profits,  p is price,  X is sales or output,  w is the rate  of compen- 
sation  per  manhour,  and  L is manhours.10  It has been  customary-and for 
the most part fruitful-to concentrate  the analysis  on price  behavior,  al- 
lowing  profits  to be determined  residually  by equation  (1).11 
Modern  econometric  price theories  run roughly  as follows: Consider- 
able evidence  has accumulated  that industrial  firms  tend to set prices  as a 
markup  on normal  average  costs. This is sometimes  called the "normal- 
price  hypothesis"12-"normal"  signifying  that a variable  is cyclically  cor- 
rected.  Firms  are assumed  to produce  output  using  current  and overhead 
inputs  with increasing  returns  in the short  run. Sales in the short  run are 
determined  by price  and cyclical  conditions,  as well as by many random 
factors.  Faced with temporary  changes  in demand,  firms  generally  alter 
production  and employment  rather  than price.  Prices  are based on long- 
run  profitability  and other  managerial  objectives  and are not significantly 
10. Equation  (1) is obviously  oversimplified  in omitting  other  fixed  costs like interest 
and taxes, and other variable  costs such as purchases  of materials,  which will be intro- 
duced  below. 
11. Much of the theory discussed in this section grew out of work with Wynne 
Godley of the Department  of Applied Economics,  University  of Cambridge,  England. 
An application  of the theories  is contained  in William  D. Nordhaus  and Wynne Godley, 
"Pricing  in the Trade  Cycle,"  Economic  Journal,  Vol. 82 (September  1972),  pp. 853-82. 
Further  results  will be presented  in a forthcoming  monograph. 
12. See Nordhaus and Godley, "Pricing  in the Trade Cycle," for a more precise 
discussion  of the normal-price  hypothesis. 184  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1974 
adjusted  to cyclical  conditions.  Thus from the firm's  point of view, wage 
rates  are  set for contractual  periods  and  prices  are  determined  by long-run 
considerations,  whereas  labor  inputs  and production  are  lagged  functions 
of sales.  This  view  makes  profits  the residual  factor. 
While this statement  seems a fair, if brief, representation  of modern 
views  on short-run  industrial  price  setting,  it glosses  over  some  unresolved 
issues.  First, although  most of the empirical  evidence  supports  the view 
that  costs  are  "normalized,"  in the  sense  defined  above,  before  they  enter  the 
firm's  pricing  decision,  many analysts  do not accept  this view. A second 
and more difficult  problem  concerns  the form of the markup  equation: 
which  costs are  included  in the base and  which  are  excluded?  In their  early 
writing,  Hall and Hitch stressed  "full-cost  pricing,"  which  took into ac- 
count both current  and capital costs.13 On the other hand, almost all 
empirical  work  has followed  the lead of Kalecki,  who included  only prime 
costs (generally  defined  as costs that are variable  in the short  run-labor, 
materials,  indirect  taxes), and then calculated  price as a markup  over 
them.  14 Unless  one accepts  the  Kalecki  view  of the pricing  decision  (which 
implies  that  firms  behave  as profit-maximizing  monopolists),  I see no com- 
pelling  theoretical  reason  to use one specification  rather  than the other  in 
estimating  the  short-run  price  and  profit  equations.  In any  case,  the  markup 
models  seem to me somewhat  dubious  as long-run  price equations;  they 
imply that indirect  taxes and materials  costs cumulate  in importance  as 
they  cascade  through  the system,  and further  that price  is affected  by such 
things  as the level of aggregation  of different  sectors. 
A third  question,  related  to the second,  concerns  the shifting  of direct 
taxes,  such  as the corporation  income  tax.  Theoretical  considerations  argue 
that  firms  ignore  changes  in the level  of direct  taxes  in making  pricing  deci- 
sions in the short  run, and this practice  would  be assumed  in the theories 
that  take  price  as a markup  over  current  costs. Full-cost  theories  are  some- 
times ambiguous  on this question.  The invariance  to the level of direct 
taxation  is another  weakness  of markup  theories in explaining  secular 
movements  in price  and  profits.  In the longer  run,  the markup  over  current 
13. R. L. Hall and C. J. Hitch, "Price Theory and Business Behaviour,"  Oxford 
Economic  Papers,  No. 2 (May 1939),  pp. 12-45. 
14. Michal  Kalecki, "The Distribution  of the National Income,"  in Kalecki, Essays 
in the Theory  of Economic  Fluctuations  (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939); Otto Eck- 
stein, "A Theory  of the Wage-Price  Process  in Modern  Industry,"  Review  of Economic 
Studies,  Vol. 31 (October  1964),  pp. 267-86. William  D. Nordhaus  185 
costs would  (other  things  equal)  gradually  drift  up and  down  as the level  of 
direct  taxation  rose and fell. 
A final set of unanswered  questions  concerns  the long-run  decisions. 
Under  what  conditions  does the markup  change,  and what  is the relation 
between  pricing  and investment  decisions?  These are much harder  ques- 
tions and  must  be postponed  to the next section. 
ALTERNATIVE  SPECIFICATIONS 
Consider  a firm that produces  output (X) from labor inputs (L) and 
capital  inputs  (K). Let the subscript  n represent  normal,  or cyclically  cor- 
rected,  values.  The markup  hypothesis  assumes  that 
(2)  p =  (1+m)['L  + C]+  v, 
where  p is price,  m the cyclically  invariant  markup,  v materials  cost per 
unit  output,  w the wage  rate,  and C other  costs that are  included  in a given 
specification.  From the profits  identity,  profits  before tax are given by: 
(3)  H  = pX-  wL -  D  -  I-  vX-  zX, 
where  D is depreciation,  I is interest  payments,  and z is the rate  of indirect 
business  taxation. 
A "full-cost"  variant  of the markup  hypothesis  is target-return  pricing. 
This assumes 
(4)  wL. +  D +  zX.  +  vX. +  r.K 
Xn 
where  rn  is the target  or required  return  on capital  and K is the value of 
capital. 
To make operational  the two normal-price  hypotheses  shown  in equa- 
tions (2) and (4) requires  first  normalizing  the variables.  The only difficult 
problem  is to guess  how  producers  form  expectations  about  normal  output, 
Xn.  I assume  that  they  simply  project  output  from  past  trends  and  make  a 
cyclical  correction.  Thus  at every  time t, the current  and future  path of X, 
-for  example,  XQ(t),  XQ(t  +  1), . .-.is  the prediction  of a regression  run- 
ning over . ..  X(t -  1), X(t). In the regression I used, log output entered 
as a quadratic  function  of time and the civilian  unemployment  rate.  Thus 
a regression  for the period  1948-73  gives  the following: 186  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1974 
(5)  In X =  5.54 +  0.0429t  +  0.00018t2  -  0.035 (u -  4.77). 
(76.1)  (2.7)  (11.3) 
R2=  0.998; standard  error  of estimate = 0.0169; Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.33. 
The numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
The term (u -  4.77) is the deviation of the unemployment rate from its 
postwar average of 4.77 percent; In Xn is simply the prediction of equa- 
tion (5) when u =  4.77 percent. 
Strictly speaking, I should have fit (5) for every year to calculate the best 
estimate of X,. I tried a couple of these, but fortunately  it didn't make much 
difference. Thus if I had run through  1965 rather than  1973, XJ(1965) 
would have been about 1 percent higher. The stability of (5) over the post- 
war period means that Xn changes little from year to year with changes in 
the sample. For what it's worth, normal output for 1973 in 1958 prices was 
$507.4 billion, versus the actual figure of $512.2 billion. 
The second variable that must be normalized is labor productivity. I have 
assumed that the logarithm of normal productivity is a quadratic function 
of time and of the deviation of output from its trend value.15 The fitted 
equation was 
(6)  ln (X/L)  -5.49  +  0.0286t +  0.00010t2  +  0.226 In (X/Xn). 
(71.1)  (2.1)  (3.9) 
R2 = 0.997; standard  error  of estimate = 0.012; Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.40. 
The numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
For normal productivity (X/Ln)  I use the prediction of this equation 
when output is at its normal level. Although productivity is not a primary 
concern of this paper, note that a slight acceleration shows up, contrary to 
my estimate of the underlying trend for the economy as a whole.16 This 
conclusion implies that measured productivity growth in the noncorporate 
sector, along with sectoral shifts, is retarding  the overall rate of productivity 
growth. 
According to equation (6), normal productivity per manhour has been 
growing at about 3.2 percent annually over the last few years. There were 
notable exceptions, however. Normal productivity (that is,  productivity 
corrected for capacity utilization but retaining the residuals) did poorly 
15. The rationale  for this form of equation was explored  in William D. Nordhaus, 
"The Recent Productivity  Slowdown," BPEA (3:1972), pp. 493-536. Note that the 
caveat about annually  refitting  (5) applies equally  to (6). 
16. Ibid., pp. 496-98. William  D. Nordhaus  187 
from 1965 to 1967, growing at only 2.0 percent annually. On the other hand, 
1971 was a very good year with normal productivity growing at 6 percent; 
and 1973 seems to have been right on target. The surprises in productivity 
may well have contributed to  unexplained short-run movements for the 
years when the equation does poorly; but given the good  fit of (6), the 
magnitude of unexplained movements is quite small. 
A final problem involves the pesky inventory valuation adjustment. The 
price, sales, and output data that the Department of Commerce publishes 
use replacement-cost valuation. As  noted above, most  accounting tech- 
niques use historical cost (or average cost). Perhaps  the Wall Street Journal 
exaggerated when it asserted that most businessmen have never heard of 
IVA;17  it seems safer to assume that most of them base their actual calcula- 
tions of prices, sales, and profits on historical cost, whatever their knowl- 
edge of IVA. 
A simple example illustrates the problem. Suppose that a winery buys 
grape juice, ferments it for one year, and sells Chateau Monk wine; all 
valuation is based on historical cost. On average, the winery achieves $100 
in profits on each $1,000 of sales, for a gross margin of 10 percent. How- 
ever, depending on the rate of inflation, and the state of the wine business, 
the return in any given year will be different  from this. In any year, part of 
the return will represent  a genuine return to capital and part will represent 
capital gains on grape  juice (and would therefore be taken out by the IVA). 
In other years, all of the $100 will represent  genuine return to capital. Un- 
less the winery were to do alternative calculations on a replacement-cost 
basis, it is unlikely to be aware of what fraction of any year's return was 
genuine and what fraction was simply capital gains. Why would our monk 
care as long as year in and year out he averages his desired rate of return? 
This line of reasoning suggests that prices, sales, and profits should be 
calculated on a "businessman's  basis"-or  on historical cost-rather  than 
on the "Commerce Department basis"-or  replacement cost. To convert 
the published figures  to the businessman's  basis, the IVA (typically a nega- 
tive number reflecting the fact that prices rise) is subtracted from gross 
product, and a new deflator is calculated as the ratio of (higher-valued) 
current-dollar  to  (unaffected)  constant-dollar  businessman's  output. 
Profits are used on a "book value" basis, which is the businessman's basis 
17. "Phantom  Earnings:  Because  of Inflation,  Profit  Drop Is Deeper Than It Seems 
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as defined  above.  This adjustment  is equivalent  to putting  all concepts  on 
a historical-cost  basis. Accordingly,  in what follows, this manner  of con- 
structing  the data will be called  the historical-cost  basis.'8  The Commerce 
Department's  concepts  of profits,  output,  and price will be called  the re- 
placement-cost  basis. 
The  next  step  in calculating  normal  profits  was  to calculate  the predicted 
price  series.  Given  the lack of theoretical  or empirical  guidance  about the 
proper  form  of the equation,  I tried  six alternative  specifications.  They  are 
described  in Table  6. 
For the most part the logic of the equations  is self-evident.  The only 
practical  problem  lies in the order  for including  the variables  moving  from 
the grossest  markup  equation,  (1), to the target-return  equation.  The in- 
clusion  process  starts  with  the most variable  costs and then  adds  that item 
most likely  to be treated  as a fixed  charge.  Note that because  all variables 
are  based  on value  added,  it is implicit  that  materials  are  not marked  up as 
they pass through  the firm. 
Table 7 shows the markups  and some summary  statistics  for the six 
specifications.  The simple  markup  equations-specifications  (1) and (2) in 
Table 6-clearly perform  the best in this simple  test. The specifications 
that include  the capital account  items-depreciation,  interest-and even 
the target-return  markup  version  fare  quite  poorly  over  the sample  period. 
Predicted  profits  (Ili) can be determined  residually  from  the price  equa- 
tion and the profits  identity,  simply  by inserting  pi into equation  (3) using 
actual  output  and costs: 
(7)  Hi=-iX  -  wL-  I -zX  -D. 
The actual  level of profits  plus IVA and that implied  by specification  (1) 
of the  normal-profits  hypothesis  are  reported  in Table  8. (Note that  the sta- 
tistics  in this table use the familiar  Commerce  Department  replacement- 
cost basis  rather  than  the historical-cost  basis  used  elsewhere  in this  paper.) 
The postwar  history  of corporate  profits  comes out very clearly  in the 
data of Table 8. Over most of the period, profits  are quite predictable 
from  knowledge  of actual  costs and normal unit labor  costs. With  the ex- 
ception  of an erratic  movement  during  the  Korean  War,  this  relation  tracks 
18. The use of "historical  cost" as a description  is slightly  inaccurate.  Some corpora- 
tions use techniques  other than historical-cost  valuation,  although  the majority  still use 
historical  cost. It would be more accurate  to use the description  "book value" rather 
than "historical  cost." William D. Nordhaus  189 
Table 6.  Alternative  Specifications  of Price-Profits Hypothesisa 
Specification  number  and  description  Equation 
(1) Price marked up on normal unit labor  (1 +  m) wLn 
cost  Pi  =  +m)X 
(2)  Price  marked  up  on  normal  unit labor  p  (  -  +  ) (wL +), 
cost  plus indirect taxes  X. 
(3) Price marked up on normal unit labor  (1+  m3) wL + z +D 
cost  plus indirect taxes plus normal  de- 
= 
(X.n  X 
preciation 
(4) Price marked up on normal unit labor  (wLn  D  I  l 
cost  plus indirect taxes plus normal  de-  X.  X.  X. 
preciation  plus normal  interest 
(5) Target-return  pricing (I): price equals  wL,  D  D  b  K 
costs, plus  a normal  before-tax  return  on  X.  X.  X. 
capital 
(6) Target-return  pricing (II): price equals  p  wL,, +  ?  D  ?  ra  K 
cost plus direct taxes plus normal after-  Po 
XX  (1  -)X 
tax return  on capital 
a.  The variables are defined as follows: 
p  =  deflator  for gross product of nonfinancial corporations, historical-cost basis 
Pi =  predicted  price in specification i, i =  1,  .  6, historical-cost basis 
ml,  .M4  =  markup 
X  = gross product of nonfinancial  corporations, 1958 prices, historical-cost basis 
w = compensation per manhour 
(Ln/Xn) = normal labor inputs per unit output 
z = indirect business taxes per unit of real output 
D  = economic depreciation,  from Table 2, column (2), above 
I  = net interest 
K = replacement  cost of net stock of corporate capital, current prices 
rb=  average before-tax rate of return on capital =  13.3 percent 
rn =  average after-tax rate of return on capital = 7.1 percent 
r  = effective corporate tax rate 
Table 7.  Residual Error  in Alternative  Specifications  of Price-Profits 
Hypothesis 
Specifica-  Markup  Standard  deviation  of  Sum of squared  errors  of 
tion  (mi)  (e =  p/p)a  (e = p/p)a 
1  1.55  0.0132  0.0044 
2  1.36  0.0137  0.0047 
3  1.21  0.0186  0.0086 
4  1.19  0.0253  0.0160 
5  1.00  0.0215  0.0113 
6  1.00  0.0236  0.0136 
Source: Table 6. 
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Table 8.  Actual  and Predicted  Before-Tax  Profits  Plus  Inventory 
Valuation  Adjustment,  Nonfinancial  Corporations,  1948-73 
Billions  of dollars,  replacement-cost  basis 
Actual profits  Predicted 
Year  and IVA  profits  Residual 
1948  29.6  25.7  3.9 
1949  26.8  26.3  0.5 
1950  33.5  28.0  5.5 
1951  38.0  36.6  1.4 
1952  34.8  36.3  -1.5 
1953  33.9  38.1  -4.2 
1954  31.8  36.4  -4.6 
1955  40.3  42.3  -2.0 
1956  39.1  38.1  1.0 
1957  38.3  39.3  -1.0 
1958  33.5  32.3  1.2 
1959  42.8  41.8  1.0 
1960  40.3  39.7  0.6 
1961  40.3  38.1  2.2 
1962  45.0  43.6  1.4 
1963  48.6  46.8  1.8 
1964  55.2  53.8  1.4 
1965  64.1  60.9  3.2 
1966  69.4  67.0  2.4 
1967  65.1  60.7  4.4 
1968  70.4  70.4  0.0 
1969  62.1  66.6  -4.5 
1970  50.7  54.8  -4.1 
1971  59.2  69.8  -10.6 
1972  67.3  74.1  -6.8 
1973  79.3  83.0  -3.7 
Sources: Actual profits and IVA are from the sources cited for Table 2. Predicted profits are from speci- 
fication (1) of the price equation in Table 6, and from equation (7). Residual equals actual minus predicted. 
well over the entire  period  from 1948  to 1968,  especially  in catching  the 
cyclical movements  in profits.  However,  after 1968,  profits  began to de- 
teriorate  and so did the ability  of the equation  to track  them. By 1971  it 
was overpredicting  them  by $11 billion,  or fualy  18 percent.'9 
19. One of the weaknesses  of the foregoing procedure  is that the level of normal 
output must be inferred  rather  than observed.  At the suggestion  of Alan Greenspan,  I 
substituted  a measure  of capacity  utilization  in both the normal-output  equation,  (5), and 
the  productivity  equation,  (6). The quadratic  terms  in both equations  were  much  smaller 
than in the previous  version. When normal unit labor cost was constructed  using the William D. Nordhaus  191 
It should  be emphasized  that  the formulation  of the price  equation  used 
here differs  from  the usual  markup  equation  only in excluding  the IVA- 
that is, only in calculating  profits,  value added, and price on historical 
rather  than replacement  cost of inventories.  This minor  change  makes  all 
the difference  over  the 1968-73  period.  If exactly  the same  technique  were 
followed  using the Commerce  Department  rather  than the businessman's 
convention,  the residuals  would  differ  as follows: 
Residual using  Residual using 
Commerce  businessman's 
Year  convention  convention 
(replacement cost)  (historical cost) 
1968  -0.3  0.0 
1969  -5.9  -4.5 
1970  -7.8  -4.1 
1971  -14.7  -10.6 
1972  -10.5  -6.8 
1973  -13.5  -3.7 
The  effect  of putting  all variables  on the  basis  of historical  cost essentially 
erases  a good part of the post-1968  profit squeeze,  with the sum of the 
businessman's  residuals  being  about  one-half  that of the Commerce  resid- 
uals. Moreover,  by 1973 the businessman's  technique  puts profits after 
taxes only $4 billion  below the prediction,  compared  with $14 billion for 
the Commerce  technique.  It appears  very  likely  that "IVA  illusion"  consti- 
tutes  a very  large  fraction  of the  current  profit  squeeze.  When  in Rome . . . 
Several  conclusions  emerge  from  this  discussion.  First,  the  normal-profits 
hypothesis  provides  a good explanation  of cyclical  movements  in profits 
and of their  levels  over  most of the postwar  period.  The most satisfactory 
of the specifications  over the 1948-73  period  was one that assumes  that 
prices are marked  up over normal labor costs. The target-return  price 
equations,  either  with or without  shifting  terms,  performed  considerably 
worse  than the simple  markup  equations. 
Second,  the evidence  for short-run  shifting  of corporate  profits  taxes is 
utilization series, the price forecast changed very little. Thus, under the specification 
using normal output, the actual 1973 price was 0.62 percent  below the prediction,  as 
against  0.63 for the utilization  specification.  In fact, for the post-1966  years,  the utiliza- 
tion specification  overpredicts  profits  more than the normal-output  specification.  Over 
the postwar  period  as a whole,  the utilization  specification  has a standard  error  approxi- 
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slightly  unfavorable.  Versions  of the price  and profit  function  that exclude 
any  form  of capital  taxes  or capital  costs perform  considerably  better  than 
those  that include  them.  While  this result  is hardly  conclusive,  it does cast 
doubt on theories that indicate short-run  shifting of  corporate  taxes 
through  prices. 
Finally, none of the specifications  is able to account for the sag in 
profits  since the mid-1960s.  Though  only the predictions  of specification 
(1) are shown  in Table 8, the other  specifications  perform  worse  over the 
last ten years.  The post-1968  period  remains  a small  puzzle.  On the other 
hand, similar  puzzles,  with long runs of negative  and positive residuals, 
appear  in the earlier  periods. 
PROFITS  IN  THE  LONGER  RUN 
The previous  discussion  demonstrates  the difficulty  of attempting  to use 
simple  markup  models  to explain  the behavior  of profits  in recent  years. 
I turn  now to a different  kind of perspective-one that integrates  the pric- 
ing decision  with those longer-term  considerations  of setting  capacity,  of 
capital-labor  substitution,  and of the "net"  profitability  of the corporate 
sector  as a whole. Since long-period  analysis  is fraught  with controversy 
over  both concepts  and  techniques,  I set out these  remarks  only as a tenta- 
tive guide  to the longer-term  movement  in profits. 
I will  consider  three  important  long-run  decisions  confronting  firms:  set- 
ting capacity,  the capital-labor  ratio,  and the price. 
I assume  firms  are concerned  with maximizing  the value per share of 
equity.  They  are  constrained  on the one hand  by demand  relations,  and on 
the other  by production  functions  and  factor  costs.  The  representative  firm 
is faced  with  a demand  function  that  is a function  of its price  and  aggregate 
output.  Its production  function  is assumed  to be constant  returns  to scale, 
and it takes  factor  prices-the rate  of compensation  (w) and the rental  on 
capital  (q)-as  given.  Given the production  function,  there  is a dual cost 
function  C(w,  q)  that  gives  average  cost  (also  normal  cost in the  terminology 
of the last section)  as a function  of the wage  rate  and  the rental  on capital. 
I have  shown  the demand  function  as D(p) and  the cost function  as C(w,  q) 
in Figure 4. If price were competitively  determined,  it would settle at 
C(w,  q) and normal  output  would be X,. If the industry  has any market 
power  or intangible  property  such as patents-which seems  a fair bet for 
the corporate  sector-then price  would  be set somewhat  above  C(w,  q) and William D. Nordhaus  193 
Figure  4. The  Price-Capacity  Relation  to Profits 
Price or cost 
p  =  (1 +  m)C 
c  C(wq) 
D(p) 
| 
~  ~.  Output 
Source:  See  discussion  in  text. 
there would be profits  above the cost of capital, or "net profits"  of the 
firm.  If price  is (1 +  m) times  cost, as in Figure  4, then  normal  output  will 
be somewhat  below  competitive  output,  say at Xn in Figure 4. The exact 
level  of this  markup  m is determined  by the average  strength  of competitive 
forces  in the corporate  sector. 
Capacity  will, of course,  be set somewhat  above normal output. Just 
how far above  is determined  in light of the level and  variability  of demand 
and the complicated  structure  of holding  costs, short-run  marginal  costs, 
frequency  and severity  of machine  failure,  the possibility  of backlogging 
orders,  and so forth. If the surveys  on capacity  can be taken seriously, 
businessmen  customarily  prefer  to have capacity  about 7 percent  above 
normal  output.20 
The final  important  decision  is the capital-labor  ratio.  In the framework 
20. See McGraw-Hill  Publications  Company,  Economics  Department,  "Annual  Sur- 
vey of U.S. Business'  Plans for New Plants and Equipment"  (April 1973 and preceding 
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set out here,  this  ratio  is picked  in such  a way  as to minimize  normal  costs, 
and is thus  a function  only of factor  prices.  In the long run,  labor,  as well 
as financial  and  physical  capital,  are  all assumed  to be very  elastically  sup- 
plied to the corporate  sector. In what follows I distinguish  between  the 
"cost  of capital"-roughly  the interest  rate on debt and  equity  that  corpo- 
rations  must pay to raise financial  capital; the "rental  on capital"-the 
implicit  annual  dollar  cost per unit of tangible  capital;  and the "rate  of 
return"-the annual  percentage  income earned  per dollar of net capital 
stock  owned.  The  rental  on capital  is the relevant  cost for the capital-labor 
decision;  it is a function  of both the price  of capital  goods, and  the cost of 
capital-which is in turn determined  by the "risk-free"  real interest  rate 
and the supply  price  of funds  for risky  equities. 
I will return  to a definition  and  justification  of the various  concepts.  At 
this stage  it suffices  to say that the cost of capital  is essentially  a weighted 
average  of the cost of debt and equity  capital;  and the rental  on capital  is 
the price of capital goods times the sum of the real before-tax  cost of 
capital  and the depreciation  rate on corporate  capital. 
To be more  specific,  I assume  that  normal  output  is produced  according 
to a production  function  characterized  by constant  elasticity  of substitution 
(CES).  The rate of labor-augmenting  technological  change  is assumed  to 
exceed  the rate of capital-augmenting  technological  change  by the rate  g. 
The production  function  for normal  output  can be written  as 
(8)  Xn =  A{dK-b +  (1 -  d)[Ln exp  (gt)]-b}I-lb; 
here,  A and d are inessential  parameters. 
Cyclical  demand  for labor  is given  by 
(9)  L  (x)h  X <  X 
where  X is capacity  output. 
From  (8), the cost-minimizing  normal  capital-labor  ratio  is given  by 
(10)  In (K/Ln) =  constant +  o-  In (w/q) +  (1 -  o)gt; 
here,  o-  =  1/(1 +  b), where  b is found  in equation  (8). 
Adding  the cyclical  correction  yields  the observed  cost-minimizing  capital- 
labor  ratio: 
(11)  In (K/La) =  c' +  o-(w/q)  +  (1 -  o-)gt  -  h ln(X/X.). 
For given  output,  (11) also defines  the equilibrium  or normal  gross  factor 
shares  (qK/wLn)  as a function  of factor  costs. William  D. Nordhaus  195 
Given  the cost-minimizing  capital-labor  ratio,  the next  decision  involves 
the setting of capacity.  I assume  that capacity  output (X) is set so that 
normal  output  is some fraction  1/(1 + J) of capacity: 
(12)  X =  (1 +f)Xn. 
The ratio Xn/X  is customarily  set at around  93 percent  for manufacturing; 
nor has it changed  much  since  the late sixties.  Equation  (12) is added  for 
logical completeness,  but it is not needed  in the estimation  that follows. 
Finally,  the average  cost of output  can be calculated.  If p is the after-tax 
cost of capital,  then average  total normal  historical  cost, C, is given by 
(13)  C=_  WLn  +  pK  +  z +  D 
where  r is the effective  tax rate  on capital  income,  z is the rate of indirect 
business  taxes,  and D is economic  depreciation.  Equation  (13) differs  from 
specifications  (5) and (6) of the price  equation  in Table  6 in that (13) uses 
the current  cost of capital  in calculating  cost while  those specifications  use 
a fixed target  rate of return.  Another  route, which I have not followed, 
would be to derive  the cost function  explicitly  from (8) and to use this 
rather  than  historical  factor  supplies  in (13). 
Finally,  price  is assumed  to be a fraction  (1 +  m) of average  cost: 
(14)  p  =  (1 +  m)C. 
The relationship  between  average  total normal  cost and price  (both on the 
historical  basis)  is shown  in Figure  5. I have  estimated  the share  equation 
(11) and the price  equation  (14) over  the postwar  period.  In what  follows, 
all concepts  will be on the historical-cost  basis. 
The estimated  share  equation  ( lla) shows how the capital-labor  ratio 
varies  with changes  in factor  prices. 
(lla)  ln (K/L)  = 
-5.30  +  0.0216 ln (w/q) +  0.0250t -  0.686 ln (X/Xn). 
(0.053)  (0.0029)  (0.094) 
R2 =  0.9992; standard error of estimate  =  0.0122; 
Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.68; first-order  correlation  coefficient  = 0.895. 
The numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors. 
According  to the share  equation,  normal  factor  proportions  shift very 
little after  a change  in relative  factor  costs.  The  estimated  elasticity  of sub- 
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Figure  5. Relation  of Prices  and  Average  Total  Normal  Cost, 
Nonfinancial  Corporations,  Historical-Cost  Basis,  1948-73 
Price or cost  per unit  of 1958-dollar  output  (semi-log  scale) 
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Source: Price equation discussed in the text. 
those  most other  studies  have  found.  On the other  hand,  in the absence  of 
serious specification  error, the small standard  error rules out very big 
elasticities.  A t-test of the null Cobb-Douglas  hypothesis  (a =  1) has a 
value  of 18. 
The specification  of the share  equation  differs  from  that  in other  studies 
of the elasticity  of substitution,  most of which  rely  either  on cross-sectional 
estimates  or on equations  relating  average  labor productivity  to factor 
costs. Also, note that the share equation  includes  inventories  as well as 
fixed  capital;  and, finally,  that the capital  costs are average  (or effective) 
costs  rather  than the more  appropriate  marginal  cost of capital. 
The  implications  of the  low elasticity  are  striking.  As the  rental  on capital 
falls (for reasons  to be explored  below)  the normal  capital-labor  ratio re- 
sponds  modestly.  Thus, when the cost of capital  fell sharply  in the early 
postwar  period,  taking  the rental  on capital  along  with  it, both the net and William  D. Nordhaus  197 
the gross  shares  of capital  declined.  The  movement  in capital's  share  in the 
1960s  has a different  explanation.  During  this period  the effective  tax rate 
on corporations  fell sharply  while  the after-tax  cost of capital  held  roughly 
constant.  In this situation  a low elasticity  of substitution  implies  that the 
net share  of capital  would  return  to the level  it held  before  the tax change. 
The  gross  share  (inclusive  of taxes)  would  decline  with  the tax burden. 
As long as the elasticity  of substitution  is less than  unity,  the direction  of 
the movement  in shares  will be the same  as described  above,  although  the 
quantitative  magnitudes  would  be attenuated.  A zero  elasticity  means  that 
the gross  share  of capital  moves  exactly  proportionally  with  the ratio  of the 
gross  rental  to wages.  A more  moderate  value  of the elasticity  would  sug- 
gest some  capital-labor  substitution  and therefore  a less than  proportional 
drop  in capital's  gross  share.  One  might,  for example,  set the elasticity  of 
substitution  at an a priori  level  and  ask  how  far  off  track  the share  currently 
is. To test out this idea, I set the elasticity  at one-half  and reran  the shares 
equation.  Obviously  the in-sample  fit deteriorated  considerably,  with the 
standard  error  of estimate  rising  from 0.012 to 0.027. Moreover,  the last 
few years  saw very  large  prediction  errors,  with  the actual  share  below  the 
predicted  share  by an average  of 5 percent  over the last two years. This 
compares  with an overprediction  of 1 percent  for equation  (11  a) as esti- 
mated above.  These  results  confirm  the impression  that the low elasticity 
plays a leading  role in the tale of the falling  share  of capital. 
The estimated  price  equation,  (14a),  is also surprising: 
(14a)  +  m))- 
(0.  179)C  (1  ?  ?  0.14  (p  C 
where 
(1 +  m) =  0.059 
(0.056) 
A2 = 0.843; standard  error  of estimate = 0.0199; 
Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.94. 
The numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors. 
Perhaps  the most interesting  result  is that the markup  over  total cost, m, 
is about 6 percent,  although  this coefficient  is not well determined:  the 
estimate  for the markup  in equation  (14a) is 0.059 with a standard  error 
of 0.056. (The term  (1 + m) enters  nonlinearly,  and this accounts  for the 198  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1974 
unusual  presentation  of the results  in equation  (14a) above.)  The pattern 
of adjustment  of the markup  is less satisfactory.  The equation  is essen- 
tially  a damped  second-order  difference  equation. 
Again,  interpreting  the actual  movements  of profits  in the light of those 
predicted  by the  movement  of average  cost proves  an enlightening  exercise. 
(Note that profits are on an historical-  rather  than a replacement-cost 
basis.)  The decline  in the share  and rate of return  of capital  from 1948  to 
the mid-1950s  is entirely  consistent  with movements  in average  cost. By 
this explanation,  price  was at about  the right  level  in the mid-1950s.  Start- 
ing about 1958,  price  moved  to about 5 percent  above  average  cost; from 
1958  to 1973  it remained  there  on the average,  within  a range  of 4 percent 
and 7 percent  above cost. According  to this explanation,  there  has been 
no profit squeeze  in the last few years. In the best specification  of the 
markup  equation,  price  rose 1.2 percent  less than predicted  from 1966 to 
1973.  If price  is compared  with average  total normal  cost, it can be seen 
that price  actually  rose 0.8 percent  more  than total cost over  the period. 
Another  way of viewing  the profits  picture  is to compare  the average 
rate of return  on capital with its cost. Over the entire 1948-73 period 
corporate  capital  earned  an average  of 7.1 percent  after  taxes, while the 
average  cost of capital  was 6.5 percent.  After 1958,  the differential  was 
somewhat  wider,  averaging  1.9  percentage  points.  During  the recent  "profit 
squeeze,"  the gap  has averaged  1.7 percentage  points. 
The  meaning  of this  meager  differential  is not clear.  What  is clear  is that, 
taking  the postwar  period  as a whole,  the corporate  sector  has experienced 
essentially  no "net" profitability.  This is a most surprising  result,  given 
popular  notions  about  monopoly  power,  and the undoubted  existence  of 
supernormal  returns  to major  inventions  and  knowhow. 
WHY  HAS  THE  COST  OF  CAPITAL  FALLEN? 
I have indicated  that most of the puzzle  about the profits  share  is ex- 
plicable  by the more or less continuous  fall in the cost of capital.  This 
section  elaborates  on the concept  of the cost of capital  and suggests  some 
tentative  hypotheses  about  its decline  over  the postwar  period. 
A formal  definition  of the cost of capital  rests on the way the costs of 
debt and equity are combined  in the analysis.  In a world with neither 
transactions  costs  nor  taxes,  capital  would  cost the same  whether  its source William  D. Nordhaus  199 
were debt, equity,  or retained  earnings.  In the real world of corporation 
and income  taxes,  debt  financing  is more  advantageous  than  equity  financ- 
ing, for low levels  of debt.  But debt  financing  becomes  relatively  costly as 
the probability  of bankruptcy  rises. Assuming  firms  set the debt-equity 
ratio  so as to maximize  the price  per  share  of equity,  the optimal  ratio  will 
come at the point at which  the probability  of bankruptcy  outweighs  the 
gains  from  further  debt  financing.  I assume  that the subjective  probability 
distribution  on the rate of return  determines  the optimal  ratio of debt to 
total financing,  say d*. Several  factors  will influence  d* over  time,  but the 
most important  is probably  the perceived  riskiness  of investment  in tan- 
gible capital. As investment  looked safer over the postwar  period, one 
would  predict  that d* would  increase-as indeed  it did. 
In principle,  it would  be desirable  to calculate  the marginal  cost of cap- 
ital and compare  it with the marginal  return  on capital.  In practice,  one 
must settle  for calculations  of the average  cost and return.  Assuming  that 
prices  are expected  to rise at rate  wr  in the future,  the real cost of capital, 
p (before  personal  tax but after  corporate  tax), is given  by 
(15)  p  =  (rb -xr)d*(1  -  r) +  re(l  -d*), 
where  rb is the interest  rate on bonds, r is the effective  tax rate on profits 
(genuine  capital  income  before  taxes  less interest),  and re  is the rate of re- 
turn on equities,  here taken to be the normal earnings-price  ratio on 
equities. 
The calculation  of the real  cost of capital  is a complicated  problem,  and 
I will only summarize  the steps.  The interest  rate  on bonds  is taken  to be a 
"risk-free"  rate.  Given  the thinness  of the long-term  government  market, 
I have  therefore  used  Standard  and Poor's  Aaa rate.  The rate  of return  on 
equities,  re, is taken to be Standard  and Poor's  dividend  yield corrected 
for the ratio of genuine  income after  tax less interest  (from Table 3) to 
dividends.  The  share  of debt  in total  financing  is the ratio  of net debt  (from 
the flow of funds  accounts  of the Federal  Reserve)  to the replacement  cost 
of total tangibles.  The  corporate  tax rate  is the effective  tax rate  on profits 
after the depreciation  adjustment  is made. Finally, the expected  rate of 
increase  of capital  goods prices  is the prediction  imputed  to an investor 
with rational  expectations  and a first-order  autoregressive  equation  in the 
rate of increase  of capital  goods  prices. 
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Figure  6 shows  that  the simplest  form  of the cost of capital  one might  want 
to use-the  uncorrected  earnings-price  ratio re-moves along with the 
more  complete  calculation  given  in equation  (15). 
Figure  6 clearly  reveals  the considerable  decline  in the cost of capital 
over  the last twenty  years.  Most of the decline  occurred  in the early  years, 
from 11  percent  in the 1948-S0  period  to 5 percent  in the late 1950s;  since 
that time the cost has wobbled  between  4 and 7 percent.  The only other 
important  factor  was the rise of p relative  to re, also shown in Figure 6. 
This  change  was due mainly  to the increase  in the rate  of interest  over the 
period.  By 1973,  the real average  cost of debt was roughly  equal to the 
cost of equity-3.8 percent  compared  with 4.1 percent,  according  to my 
calculation. 
What  explains  the dramatic  fall in the cost of capital?  The answer  seems 
to me to lie in the general  economic  climate  and in the gradual  dissipation 
of the fear of a new Great Depression.  For many years after the crash, 
investors  justifiably  worried  about a repetition  of those events.  Even as 
late as March  1955,  when  the fear  might  reasonably  have  faded,  the state- 
Figure 6.  Cost of Capital and Earnings-Price  Ratio in the 
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ment  by Professor  Galbraith  that the Great  Crash  could  repeat  itself was 
sufficient  to send the market  into a temporary  panic-or  so he claims.2' 
Since  that  time,  however,  the memory  of the bad old days  has dimmed; 
and this freedom  from fear  may well provide  a rationale  for the postwar 
movement  in the cost of capital.  To breathe  content  into this proposition, 
I will assume  that the holders  of securities  are risk-averse  maximizers  of 
expected  utility. For simplicity,  assume  that the preferences  of security 
holders  can be represented  by a utility  function  with constant  elasticity  a 
(or constant  relative  risk  aversion,  3 -  1)  in total  consumption,  with  utility 
independent  over  time.  Further  assume  that investors  allocate  their  wealth 
over bonds and a risky  mutual  fund of equities  of all corporations.  The 
corporate  sector  owns the fraction  k of the economy's  wealth;  the rest is 
perfectly  safe  government  debt  and  risky  noncorporate  capital.  Finally,  the 
real  rate  of return  on bonds  is (i -  7r) and  the real  rate  on unlevered  equi- 
ties is p with a subjective  normal  distribution  with mean - and standard 
deviation  s. Under  these  conditions  it can be shown  (ignoring  all moments 
above  the  second)  that  the  investor  divides  his portfolio  in fixed  proportions 
between  bonds and unlevered  equities  in such a way that 
7-i-  +  2Rk(1-05)S2 
2RZ2  +  (1 -  13)(2  -  13)k2S2' 
Here  p is then  the  equilibrium  cost of capital  when  the portfolio  is allocated 
so as to maximize the expected utility, and  -  =  [kp +  (1 -  k)(i -  7r)r-1. 
For a small s2, or (  near zero (more precisely,  with percent  error of 
100(3  -  1)(0  -  2)X2s2/2A2),  or in continuous  time, this can be approxi- 
mated  as 
(16)  + (1-  O)s2k 
R 
It is most convenient  to interpret  (16) as the risk premium  on unlevered 
equities  required  to induce  security  holders  to hold a fraction  k of their 
portfolios  in that form,  given  their  relative  risk aversion  (/  -  1) and  their 
perception  of the variance  as  S2. 
To simplify  the analysis  I assume  that k(l -  p)/A is constant  for the 
postwar  period.  The  main  difficulty  in applying  (16)  is that  there  is no good 
way to guess  the subjective  uncertainty  in the investor's  mind about the 
21. John  Kenneth  Galbraith,  The  Great  Crash,  1929  (2d ed., Houghton  Mifflin,  1961), 
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rate  of return  on equities.  As a start,  I calculated  the one-year  market  yield 
to holding  equities  (dividend  yield plus capital gains),  rm,  going back to 
1910.  It came  as no surprise  that  rm  experienced  much  greater  swings  in the 
prewar  period  than  in the last twenty  years.  To get a more  precise  measure 
of the movement  in the market  yield, I calculated  a series  of twenty-year 
moving  variances  of rm  over  this period,  reported  in Table  9; over  the post- 
war  years  the variance  declined  to a quarter  of its 1945  value.  To convert 
these observed  variances  to the variance  of unlevered  equities,  the calcu- 
lated variance is divided by (1 -  d*)2, where d* is again the ratio of net 
debt  to the replacement  cost of tangibles. 
A moving  twenty-year  variance  may not adequately  reflect  the extent  to 
which  wide  swings  occurred  over 1925-45. This set of weights  implies  that 
when  Professor  Galbraith  frightened  Wall Street  in 1955,  depresso-phobia 
was about half its intensity  in 1945;  it further  assumes  that no trace re- 
mained  by 1973. 
The estimate  of this equation  for 1948  to 1973  is 
(17)  (p-i  +  7r)  =  1.81  s2, 
(0.13) 
R2 =  0.724; standard  error  of estimate = 0.026; Durbin-Watson  statistic = 0.69. 
The number  in parentheses  is a standard  error. 
which  catches  the general  downward  movement  in the risk premium.  The 
estimate  of (1 - ,)k/R  is 1.8  for the postwar  period.  To convert  this to an 
estimate of (1 -  X) requires  calculating  the value of k. The shares of 
corporate  and  noncorporate  tangibles  in total net national  wealth  for 1960 
Table  9. Twenty-Year  Moving  Variance  of the One-Year  Market  Yield 
on Equities,  1925-73 
Variance of market 
Period  yield 
1925-45  0.0570 
1930-50  0.0496 
1935-55  0.0304 
1940-60  0.0205 
1945-65  0.0145 
1950-70  0.0160 
1953-73  0.0146 
Source: Calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial 
Times to 1957 (1960), p. 656, and Survey of Current  Business, relevant issues. One-year market yield equals 
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were 0.2 and 0.7, respectively;  the correlation  between  corporate  capital 
income  and other  property  income  is 0.5 over  the postwar  period.  If other 
capital  is as risky  as corporate  capital,  this suggests  a value  of k = 0.65 as 
appropriate in calculating (1 -  j),  so (1-  =  3 and :  is estimated to 
be approximately  -2. 
Figure  7 depicts  the predicted  and  actual  movements  in the  risk  premium 
over the postwar  period.  According  to equation  (17) the actual  risk pre- 
mium has been below the calculated  premium  since 1968.  For 1973 the 
predicted  level of the risk premium-predicted  from equation  (17), given 
the estimated  riskiness  of portfolio  investment-was 4.4 percent,  while  the 
actual  premium  was only 0.4 percent.  By historical  standards  a risk pre- 
mium  of equities  over  bonds of only one-half  percent  seems  very  small;  it 
suggests  either  that tastes  have changed  or that stock prices  in 1973  were 
too high by historical  standards. 
Are there  any  explanations  for the low level  of the risk  premium?  In the 
first  place,  investors  may be displaying  "IVA illusion"  in much the same 
way businessmen  do when  they  make  price  decisions.  Recall  from  Table  3 
that IVA was 35 percent  of genuine  capital  income  after  tax in 1973.  IVA 
Figure  7. Relation  of Actual  and  Predicted  Risk  Premium  on Equities, 
1948-73 
Percent  per year 
20 
1  5 
I  0 
Predicted 
5 
t  ~~~~Actual  - 
0 
1950  1960  1970 
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illusion  would  make  the yield  on equities  (and  thus the risk  premium)  ap- 
pear  considerably  higher  than  it in fact is. A second  factor  is that the mar- 
ket may be anticipating  a higher  inflation  rate than the autoregressive 
model.  The latter  predicts  4.1 percent  for 1973  and 4.5 percent  for 1974. 
Combining  IVA illusion  with an anticipated  long-run  rate of inflation  of 
7 percent  would  give a perceived  risk premium  of 4 percent-rather  than 
0.4 percent-which is much  closer  to the historical  norm. 
The decline  in the stock market  since 1973  has already  led to some im- 
provement  in the risk premium  as calculated  by equation (17). As of 
May 1974,  the risk  premium  stands  at about 1.0 percent. 
The  outlook  for the cost of capital  (as well  as for capital's  share)  depends 
on future  movements  in the risk premium,  among other things.  Has the 
risk  premium  settled  down  to a more  or less permanent  level,  or is it likely 
to change? 
According  to the model  developed  earlier  in this  paper,  the major  source 
of shifts  in the rate  of profit  is cyclical  movements  arising  from  fluctuations 
in aggregate  demand.  It is commonplace  to argue  that Keynesian  thought 
has so revolutionalized  economic  management  that  episodes  like the Great 
Depression  are obsolete,  and that with competent  economic  management 
the record  of the 1960s  can be the norm.  Put differently,  the improvement 
in the techniques  of macroeconomic  management  over  the last forty  years 
has brought  significant  reductions  in the normal  fluctuations  in demand- 
and therefore  in profits.  The decline  in the calculated  variances  is thus no 
accident.  Until a further  revolution  in society  or in economic  management 
renders  the Keynesian  revolution  obsolete,  fluctuations  in profits  are  likely 
to continue at the relatively  low levels experienced  over the last fifteen 
years. 
If this view is correct,  there  may  be a relatively  small  decline  in the risk 
premium  (and therefore  in the cost of capital)  as the last victims  of crash 
pessimism  die away. But, barring  a change  in preference  toward  risk or 
temporary  fluctuations,  the risk premium  and cost of capital  experienced 
over  the last few years  appear  to represent  a portfolio  equilibrium. 
Recapitulation 
The basic facts of this rather  complicated  argument  are not in dispute. 
Over  the postwar  period  the share  of measured  profits  has declined  in a 
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cleaner  definition  and  to adjust  for cyclical  factors,  the share  of net capital 
income  in net corporate  income  shows  a drop,  albeit  one less striking  than 
the uncorrected  figures  display.  I also calculated  data  on the rates  of return 
on corporate  capital,  which  revealed  a roughly  similar  pattern. 
A first  attempt  to explain  the  movement  used  six  hypotheses  on price  and 
profit  formation  in the corporate  sector.  These  indicated  that price  equa- 
tions that used a markup  on current  costs performed  considerably  better 
than those including  capital items. The preferred  equation-with price 
marked  up over  indirect  taxes  and normal  unit  labor  costs-was quite  suc- 
cessful  in predicting  cyclical  movements  in profits;  but it did  poorly  in pre- 
dicting  the secular  decline  in the share of profits.  In the six-year  period 
1968-73, all six equations  consistently  overpredicted  profits,  in a range 
from  7 percent  to 27 percent. 
A second  type of explanation  embedded  the price  equation  in a longer- 
run model. In this perspective,  the markup  of price  over current  costs is 
adjusted  upward  or downward  depending  on the net profitability  of the 
corporate  sector  as a whole.  In this view,  the normal  capital-labor  ratio  is 
determined  by relative  rental  on capital  and  labor.  The  results  of the  longer- 
run  model  were  surprising.  First,  over  the postwar  period,  sizable  changes 
in the wage-rental  ratio  induced  very  little  capital-labor  substitution.  As a 
result,  the decline  in the rental  of capital  relative  to the wage  rate  over  the 
period  led to relatively  little substitution  of capital  for labor and thus to 
a decline  in capital's  share. 
A second  surprising  conclusion  was the absence  of "net"  profitability  in 
the corporate  sector  during  this period;  that is, price  was  just sufficient  to 
cover  all costs including  the cost of capital.  What  happened  to all the oli- 
gopoly  profits  earned  by automobile  and steel  companies,  and where  were 
the rents to important  inventions  earned  by computer,  electronics,  and 
other  high-technology  firms?  The conclusion  must  be that  whatever  super- 
normal  and  monopoly  profits  or returns  to technology  accrued  were  offset 
by inefficient  firms  or perhaps  by firms  concerned  with  "managerial"  objec- 
tives and nonprice  competition.  Interestingly  enough, the great merger 
movement  of the sixties does not appear  to have driven out or scared 
enough managerial  firms  to raise the net profitability  of the corporate 
sector. 
I conclude  that the decline  in capital's  share  was genuine,  and that the 
main  reason  for this phenomenon  was the fall in the cost of capital.  One 
reason  for this  fall was  the decline  in the overall  burden  of taxation  on cor- 
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income  fell  from  a high  of 61 percent  in 1951  to a low of 38 percent  in 1967. 
A second  reason  for the fall  was  the decline  in the rate  of return  on equities, 
or the earnings-price  ratio of corporations.  I believe  that this fall, in turn, 
was due chiefly  to the dissipation  of fear  of another  Great  Depression  and 
the consequent  effect  on the risk  premium  on equities.  The combination  of 
lower  taxes and lower rates of return  on equities  led to a decline  in the 
before-tax  cost of capital  of about 55 percent  from the 1948-51  period  to 
the late 1960s. 
This view  provides  a relatively  straightforward  interpretation  of the be- 
havior  of equity  prices.  These  prices  are determined  by three  factors:  the 
rate  of return  on equities,  the effective  tax burden  on corporations,  and  the 
before-tax  rate of return  on capital.  The postwar  history  of stock prices 
falls into three  periods:  1948-55,  1955-65,  and 1965-73.  The real price  of 
equities  changed  by annual  averages  of +13.1, +7.0,  and -0.2  percent, 
respectively,  during  these  periods.  The first  period  saw extraordinary  capi- 
tal gains  because  of the sharp  decline  in the rate of return  on equities.  In 
the second, the before-tax  rate of return  on equities  was stable,  but the 
sharply  lowered  tax rate fostered  high capital  gains.  Since 1965,  all three 
factors  have  been  unfavorable.  The combination  of higher  corporate  taxes 
due to inflation,  a sharp  drop  in the before-tax  return,  and a moderate  rise 
in the rate of return  on equities  wiped  out any real gains  in equity  prices. 
What  would  the normal  pattern  look like?  Real capital  gains on corporate 
equities  generally  should  be equal  to the retention  rate  (or one minus the 
"genuine"  dividend  payout  rate)  times  the real  after-tax  rate  of return.  The 
payout  rate  has averaged  78 percent  over  the last five  years,  while  the nor- 
mal profit  rate  has averaged  about 6 percent.  Thus, year in and year out 
one would  expect  a real  capital  gain  of about  1.3  percent.  The  average  since 
1948  has been 6.0 percent. 
If the interpretation  presented  here is correct,  what of the future?  The 
first  consideration  is the effect on growth  of potential  output.  The main 
implication  of this analysis  is that the extent  to which  monetary  and fiscal 
policy can affect  the rate of capital  deepening  has been overestimated.  In 
the early 1960s,  a number  of measures  were  taken  to promote  growth  by 
lowering  the before-tax  rental  on capital.  According  to the share  equation, 
these  had little effect  on the capital-labor  ratio. Thus from the mid-fifties 
to the mid-sixties,  the before-tax  cost of capital  fell by about 25 percent, 
while  the capital-labor  ratio  grew  by 28 percent,  a rate  imperceptibly  higher 
than the postwar  average.  The main consequence  of the fiscal measures 
designed  to foster  more  rapid  growth  was  to lower  the gross  return  to capi- William  D. Nordhaus  207 
tal and the share  of capital.  If the relationship  were  to hold for the future, 
measures  designed  to spur growth  through  lowering  the cost of capital 
appear  likely  to have a high  cost-benefit  ratio. 
A second important  consequence  of the falling  share  of capital is the 
effect  on the distribution  of income.  Roughly  speaking,  for given distribu- 
tions of wealth  and  labor,  a decline  in the  net share  of capital  will  be highly 
egalitarian  in its effect.  The general  downtrend  in capital's  share  should, 
then, be accompanied  by a similar  movement  in measures  of inequality. 
And, indeed,  a sharp  decline  occurred  in the before-tax  share  of the top in- 
come  recipients  during  the period  1947-60,  followed  by virtual  stability.  In 
fact, since  the income  concept  in these  studies  is "nominal  income"  rather 
than "genuine  income,"  there  probably  has been a slight  downward  trend 
in the genuine  share  of top income  recipients  since  the profit  sag of the  mid- 
sixties.  The  view  taken  above  suggests  that (without  further  changes  in the 
tax structure  or in the general  macroeconomic  climate)  capital's  share  will 
not deteriorate  further;  if this is so, we have gotten the last egalitarian 
thrust  from  the declining  share  of capital. 
Finally,  what does the declining  share  of profits  portend  for inflation? 
Under  some  explanations  for the squeeze,  corporations  are  just waiting  for 
a chance  to recapture  the gross  margins  of the mid-sixties.  Thus  if corpora- 
tions were  to regain  their  1966  share  of GNP, the GNP deflator  would  rise 
3 percent,  or the deflator  for corporate  output would rise 5.5 percent. 
According  to this view,  complete  lifting  of the price  controls  at the end of 
April 1974  might  lead to one of the most hair-raising  inflations  in recent 
history. 
According  to the results  of the current  paper,  a catch-up  of prices of 
such a magnitude  seems  quite  implausible.  Energy  prices  aside,  if overall 
movements  of the cost of capital  and IVA illusion  are taken  into account, 
on a historical-cost  basis corporate  prices appear  to be pretty  much in 
line by postwar  standards.  On the other  hand, if the $31 billion IVA for 
the first quarter  of 1974 is accurate,  a huge bulge in historical  costs is 
waiting  to be passed  through  into final  goods prices.  If all but $10 billion 
of the $31 billion  IVA is passed  into final  prices,  one would expect  a rise 
in the corporate  deflator  of slightly more than 2.5 percent.  The pass- 
through  of the IVA will leave  the profits  share  and rate of return  at their 
levels  of the last few years.  The possibility  of recovering  the profit  margins 
of the mid-1960s  (outside  of the energy  sector)  seems quite implausible 
to me. 
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line with historical  experience.  Since 1958,  price  has averaged  5.0 percent 
above  average  total cost as calculated  in equation  (13). In 1973  price  was 
4.3 percent  above  average  total cost. Put differently,  over the entire  post- 
war  period,  the after-tax  rate  of profit  averaged  0.7 percent  more  than  the 
cost of capital;  in 1973  this figure  was also 0.7 percent. 
The long-run  outlook for the share of profits  depends,  of course, on 
future  tax  measures  as well  as on the general  health  and  quality  of manage- 
ment of the economy.  If there  are no fundamental  changes,  I expect  that 
the normal  share  of corporate  profits  before  tax (as measured  by the Com- 
merce Department  and including  the IVA and financial  firms)  will be 
around  81/?  percent  of GNP; and that the real after-tax  rate of return  on 
corporate  capital  will be around  6 percent. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Nicholas  Kaldor:  This is a most impressive  paper.  I am gratified  that it 
follows some lines of thought that we have developed  in Cambridge. 
So if I make  a number  of criticisms  I hope it is understood  that they do 
not detract  from  my very  high respect  for the paper. 
Nordhaus  uses a model of market  structure  in which  prices  are deter- 
mined  by some  sort  of full-cost  pricing  or markup.  I think  this  is a realistic 
model  for the price  leaders  in oligopolistic  industries,  but not for all firms. 
For most firms,  prices  are given by the market,  and these determine  the 
margin  of profit  they  can attain  on total  cost. Firms  take  what  they  can get. 
I am not familiar  with the evidence  for the United States,  but in the 
United  Kingdom  there  is a very wide dispersion  among  firms  in the rate 
of return  on capital  or on sales. As a result,  a marked  fall in the margin 
of profit  in the aggregate  does not necessarily  mean any change  in the 
desired  markup  or the realized  return  of those firms  that do determine 
prices.  There  may instead  have been a change  in the relationship  of costs 
between  price  leaders  and price  followers.  And the price  leaders  may not 
even be situated  inside the country.  I wouldn't  be surprised  if Sony in 
Japan  were  the price  leader  for color television  sets throughout  the world. 
In other  words,  the fall in the profit  rate  may reflect  external  influences. 
In analyzing  firms'  financing  decisions,  I think it is incorrect  to view 
internal  and external  finance as close substitutes  for one another.  We 
know that firms  stick pretty  closely to a fixed retention  ratio. They do 
not respond  to small changes  in the cost of capital by switching  from 
one type of financing  to the other-for  example,  by raising  substantial 
new equity  capital  in place of financing  through  plowed-back  profits.  In 
all countries,  including  the United States, equity capital finances  an in- 
significant  portion  of the total financial  requirements  of industry.  Borrow- 
ing is quantitatively  far more important.  But clearly  the latter is in the 
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nature  of "matching  finance."  A firm  cannot  expand  its borrowing  much 
unless  its collateral  grows  as well. 
As Nordhaus  says,  taking  account  of risk,  firms  have  a certain  optimum 
debt-asset  ratio. Thus, internal  financing  through plowed-back  profits 
and external  financing  through  loans and bonds are complementary  to 
each  other  and  not competitive.  But  this  means  that,  as long as the internal 
rate of return  is higher  than the cost of borrowing,  external  costs can be 
ignored  in determining  the rate  of return. 
What, then, determines  the rate of return?  What is the advantage  of 
price  leadership?  Firms  aim  at maximizing  growth  as a way of maximizing 
the present  value of equity. Price  leadership  allows a firm  to obtain the 
rate of profit that supports  the increase  in its own reserves  at the rate 
required  by its own optimum  growth  path. 
If the price  leader  expects  to grow  at a 5 percent  rate, and plows  back 
50 percent  of its after-tax  profits  and distributes  50 percent,  it would  aim 
at a 10 percent  target  rate of return.  But if its growth  rate is 10 percent, 
its target  rate  of return  will  have  to be 20 percent  if it is to keep  on growing 
without  financial  embarrassment  at any stage. 
I do feel that the observed  fall in profits  has to be explained.  But I 
do not think that the correlation  between the cost of capital and the 
internal  rate of return  to capital  proves  that the fall in the rate of return 
on business  investment  can be explained  by the fall in the cost of capital 
(as represented  by a weighted  average  of bond yields and equity  yields); 
and I feel that the correlation  between  them  shown  by Nordhaus  must  be 
susceptible  to some other  explanation. 
Alan  Greenspan:  This  is a most  interesting  paper  and  Nordhaus  is to be con- 
gratulated  for  his imaginative  approach  to a difficult  problem,  but  I do have 
trouble  with  this  type  of paper.  The  trouble  I have  is that  it offers  no way  of 
testing  the sensitivity  of the conclusions  either  to the specific  data  that are 
used  and the adjustments  made  to them  or to the particular  specifications 
of the model.  For example,  I cannot  judge the significance  of assuming  a 
constant  value for the technology  coefficient  in the long-run  production 
function,  equation  (8), or the constant  risk-aversion  factor  that  is assumed 
in the portfolio  model,  equation  (16). Also, risk  is identified  with  variance 
in only a limited  way and a model equating  the two may be quite in- 
adequate.  Details  aside,  Nordhaus  does identify  a real  development-that 
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that this movement reflects, in part at least, a decline in the uncertainty 
of  economic performance. But I have little confidence that his  specific 
model can predict where the cost of capital goes from here. 
The  simple autoregressive proxy  for  the  price expectations variable 
also  seems deficient: inflation premiums in  interest rates are very im- 
portant at present, so just what those expectations are is critical to Nord- 
haus' analysis. The price expectations projected here do not quite square 
with what is now going on. 
I also have doubts about the way the Commerce Department's estimates 
of capital stock are used here. These numbers certainly provide a valuable 
data base, but they do not meet the needs at hand. In constructing the 
stock estimates, Gorman uses a perpetual inventory concept which em- 
bodies  a  fixed  retirement schedule  for  a  particular cohort  of  capital 
expenditures. This convention insulates the capital stock estimates from 
responses to  an investment tax  credit or  a  reduction in  the  corporate 
tax rate-both  of  which shift the investment function  and thereby ac- 
celerate the retirement patterns. Gorman's figures on  retirements often 
differ significantly from the actual figures on the balance sheets and in- 
come statements of corporations. Nordhaus' low estimate of the elasticity 
of  substitution between capital  and  labor  may  result simply from in- 
accurate data. 
To return to estimating the risk premium, it would be useful to include 
the period before World War II, when profit margins fluctuated signifi- 
cantly. During the postwar period covered by the paper, risk persistently 
declined, as Nordhaus measures it, and I cannot have much confidence 
in  the relation of  risk to  shares judged  from this unidirectional move. 
The  paper makes some  useful adjustments to  the  usual concepts  of 
income; but one might want to make still other adjustments. If all inputs 
are priced at replacement cost, capital gains are a good deal larger than 
the inventory valuation adjustment alone. Furthermore, gains also arise 
from the liabilities side to  the extent that current borrowing costs  are 
greater than costs of older debt already on the books. With interest rates 
generally rising  throughout  the  postwar  period,  this  effect  would  be 
sizable and even Nordhaus' genuine income measure would be too high. 
Nordhaus' finding with respect to the IVA is extremely interesting. If 
product pricing is independent of the historical cost  of inputs, then in- 
ventory profits can be treated as independent of other income. But Nord- 
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from business practice to support them. Many pricing decisions are made 
directly  off the cost of materials.  For example, cotton textiles are commonly 
priced for  point  of  sale. A  firm committing to  sell cotton  cloth  three 
months hence fixes its sales price in terms of today's cotton price. Cotton 
is  purchased in  the  futures market so  that  total  profits three months 
hence are locked in. However, the part of the total that is inventory profit 
is indeterminate; that depends on the trend of cotton prices on the spot 
market over the three-month contracting period. 
In conclusion, I have some uncertainties about the future as Nordhaus' 
model would predict it.  Even if  I  agreed with his picture of  what has 
moved risk premiums in the past, I would not be comfortable projecting 
that risk premiums will remain low.  Those premiums reflect the degree 
of certainty about the future stream of cash flows. And uncertainty could 
rise over the next decade for many reasons, including requirements to 
reinvest earnings for  pollution  control  purposes and  other restrictions 
on the use of future income. Indeed, the whole concept of property rights 
and the present value  of  an expected income  stream is  changing. For 
reasons such as these, I think that the cost of capital is rising significantly. 
William Brainard: Nordhaus  has  provided us  with  an  extremely inter- 
esting and provocative paper. While verifying that there has indeed been a 
significant decline in the share of profits in the postwar period, he suggests 
that  the  current share is  consistent  with long-run equilibrium. Conse- 
quently, the decline has less  serious implications for future prices and 
investment than might have been thought. 
In the first portion of the paper Nordhaus discusses the conceptual issues 
involved in estimating profits, and attempts to correct for changes in the 
tax law, in financial structure, and in the price level, and for the difference 
between economic and tax-deductible depreciation. Nordhaus' calculations 
dramatize  the fact that these changes in accounting can make an enormous 
difference  in comparisons over time. For example, the adjustment of depre- 
ciation for changes in the price level increases by $7 billion between 1968 
and 1973. 
The three remaining portions of the paper constitute an imaginative and 
ambitious attempt to explain the short-run  movement of profits by markup 
price behavior, and the long-run movements by investment and changes in 
the cost of capital. Nordhaus limits himself to a series of simple (although 
in some cases sophisticated) models for this purpose. The advantage of 
simple models is that they enable Nordhaus to make a complete but compre- William D. Nordhaus  213 
hensible  picture  out of the various  pieces  of a rather  complicated  puzzle; 
and  in fact  the models  he specifies  do a reasonably  good  job of explaining 
the data.  Although  Nordhaus'  standard  errors  may look relatively  large, 
they  probably  give  a more  accurate  indication  of the magnitude  of forecast 
error  than those studies  that engage  in more extensive  data mining.  The 
disadvantage  of relying  on a single  model  for each  part  of the puzzle  is that 
this strategy  does not reveal  the extent to which alternative  models and 
hypotheses,  with perhaps  quite different  implications  for the future,  are 
also consistent  with  the historical  record. 
In the second  portion  of the paper,  Nordhaus  attempts  to explain  profits 
as the residual  implied  by a "normal  price"  equation,  relating  prices  to 
factor  costs at "normal"  levels  of output  and productivity.  Nordhaus  esti- 
mates  six  versions  of this  equation,  varying  the cost  base  that  is marked  up. 
He finds  that the equation  that marks  up only unit labor cost performs 
best in predicting  both prices  and profits.  This equation  explains  most of 
the cyclical  fluctuations  in profits  and a substantial  portion,  but not all, of 
the "profits  sag"  since  the mid-sixties.  As Nordhaus  emphasizes,  his exclu- 
sion of IVA  in calculating  profits,  value  added,  and  prices  does  much  of the 
work  in explaining  the "sag";  in 1973  it reduced  the residual  by approxi- 
mately $10 billion. It is quite possible,  as Nordhaus  argues,  that at the 
present  time  most businessmen  calculate  profits  and prices  on a historical- 
cost, rather  than  a replacement-cost,  basis  and  do not perceive  profits  to be 
as low as those  implied  by the Commerce  Department's  estimates.  Conse- 
quently,  the pressure  to increase  prices  may be less than one would  think 
from  looking  at the Commerce  figures.  If rapid  inflation  continues,  how- 
ever,  the possibility  that  more  and  more  firms  will convert  to replacement- 
cost calculation  should temper the optimism that Nordhaus' results 
suggest. 
All specifications  of the  Nordhaus  price  equation  rest  on a common  set of 
assumptions.  Noteworthy  among them are the following:  that demand 
does not influence  prices;  that the actual  courses  of output  and produc- 
tivity  influence  prices  only as they affect  estimates  of their  trends;  that, in 
contrast,  only  current  factor  costs  are  used  in price  calculations;  and  finally 
that  the postwar  average  rate  of unemployment  is the "normal"  unemploy- 
ment  rate  throughout  the period.  Although  these assumptions  will not be 
agreeable  to everyone,  modifying  them is unlikely to alter the results 
significantly. 
In the third portion of the paper,  Nordhaus  attempts  to link profit- 
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mizing normal capital-labor ratio is derived from a CES production func- 
tion  and  converted into  an  observed capital-labor ratio  by  a  cyclical 
correction. The estimated equation exhibits a strikingly low elasticity of 
substitution (0.02) with the implication that the gross share of capital is 
proportional to the rental-wage  ratio. Perhaps  more surprising  than the low 
elasticity is its relatively small standard error, which puts an  elasticity 
of 1 approximately  20 standard deviations away! These results may simply 
be the reflection of the fact that, correcting for cycle and trend, the capital- 
labor ratio is a very smooth series, making it impossible, with Nordhaus' 
specification, for the relatively volatile wage-rental ratio to have a large 
coefficient. If this explanation is correct, one would expect the use of a 
"normal" wage-rental ratio, or a partial adjustment form of the equation, 
to  increase the  standard error, if  not  the  magnitude, of  the  elasticity 
estimate. 
If the "sag" in profits is a result of a decline in the required  rate of return 
to capital, these equations together with the markup equation suggest that 
there is no need to worry either about price increases to enable firms to 
"catch up" or about an investment bust. In the last section of his paper, 
Nordhaus turns to  the questions of why the required rate of return on 
capital has fallen, and whether it can be expected to remain low. Measure- 
ment of the required rate of return on capital is a difficult conceptual and 
empirical  task. I have some minor complaints about the particular  assump- 
tions Nordhaus makes. I think the statutory, rather than the effective, tax 
rate should be used when attempting  to make comparable the cost of bonds 
and equity finance. Nordhaus argues that the relevant return is after tax 
and makes an effort to adjust for both the level and changes in the corpo- 
rate tax law. In the same spirit, it would seem desirable to take into account 
the features of and changes in the personal income tax law, especially the 
differential  treatment of capital gains and ordinary  income which affects the 
desirability of bond as compared with equity finance. Ideally, as Nordhaus 
notes, the concept should be marginal. In addition, the cost of debt finance 
should include some imputed cost for the effect that increasing the debt- 
equity ratio has on the probability of bankruptcy. 
The cost of capital that Nordhaus calculates shows the same qualitative 
behavior as the earnings-price ratio, with a substantial decline during the 
postwar period, concentrated primarily in the fifties. The cost of capital 
shows less decline, starting the period about 2 percent below the corrected 
earnings-price  ratio and ending about 13 percent above. Nordhaus explains 
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mates by relating  the difference  between the yield on equities and bonds to a 
(moving) twenty-year variance. Actually, then, he is estimating the differ- 
ence between the risk premiums on equities and bonds. It is not obvious 
that the perceived risk on  bonds  is  either zero or constant during the 
postwar period. Although most observers would agree with the presump- 
tion of a decline in the risk premium as the Great Crash has faded from 
memory, its exact timing and magnitude are obvious matters for specula- 
tion. In Nordhaus' regression, shortening the period over which the vari- 
ance is computed would result in a faster decline early in the period, while 
lengthening the period would stretch the decline out. 
Nordhaus believes that the risk premium is likely to stay at its relatively 
low current level, because the improvements in macroeconomic manage- 
ment and performance have been fully recognized by the market and are 
not likely to be reversed. I am not as confident. It is at least as plausible 
that the market overshot in the sixties and that investors had an overly 
optimistic view of the extent to which economic fluctuations were a thing 
of the past. Indeed, they may even have started to count on the capital 
gains that were themselves merely a consequence of  a reduction in the 
"required  rate." 
William Nordhaus:  I want to thank Professor Kaldor for his wide-ranging 
comments. He and I have quite similar views on the short-run determina- 
tion of prices and profits for industrial firms, but our views on the long-run 
determinants of the rate of profits are divergent. First, on the question of 
the role of external financing in determining the cost  of capital, Kaldor 
argues that since external and internal finance are complementary, external 
costs can be ignored. This is like saying that we can ignore the cost of left 
shoes in considering whether to buy a pair of shoes. Nor  is it true that 
equity capital finances an  insignificant fraction of investment; until re- 
cently, internal equity financed the lion's share of new investment. 
On the determinants of the rate of return, Kaldor argues that-as  long 
as  the capital-output ratio is  relatively stable-the  rate of  growth will 
determine the rate of profit. This proposition rests on the behavioral as- 
sumption that the share of internal financing in total investment is con- 
stant. Yet  there is no  good  theoretical reason for it to  be constant.  In 
addition, when Kaldor's theory is checked out as an empirical proposition, 
it  does rather poorly. There has been a secular decline of  the share of 
internal finance over the postwar period. I believe that the declining share 
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A more direct  test of Kaldor's  theory  of the profit  rate can be made by 
exploring  the slight  acceleration  in the growth  of normal  output  (see equa- 
tion 5). Given this acceleration,  Kaldor's  theory would predict  that the 
rate of profit  would  rise by about 10 percent.  Instead,  it fell by about 30 
percent.  In summary,  I think  it would  be a mistake  to base a theory  of the 
rate of profit  on a behavioral  proposition  that was grounded  neither  in 
theory  nor in observation. 
In response  to the arguments  by Brainard,  Greenspan,  and others,  con- 
cerning  the future  path of the risk premium,  my own view of the decline 
emphasizes  the role of the Keynesian  revolution  on the cyclical  stability  of 
profits.  Clearly  there  is some  residual  risk  in uncertainty  about  such  things 
as tax rates,  inflation,  environmental  policy, and the rebirth  of mercan- 
tilism;  perhaps  the sixties  were  a period  of tranquility  that could never  be 
recovered.  But I wonder  whether  objectively  these  uncertainties  are quan- 
titatively  important,  and I would guess that similar  uncertainties  have 
always  been present. 
General  Discussion 
Several  participants  questioned  the low elasticity  of substitution  be- 
tween capital and labor that Nordhaus estimates.  Robert J. Gordon 
argued  that  a long-run  average  of the ratio of capital  to labor  costs should 
have been used in determining  this elasticity,  since capital  has a long life 
and cannot  be altered  abruptly  in response  to variations  in the costs of 
capital and labor. He felt that in Nordhaus'  formulation,  the true re- 
sponsiveness  of the capital-labor  ratio was getting  absorbed  into the time 
trend  of the equation.  Robert  Hall added  that the influence  of changes  in 
factor prices on the capital-labor  ratio was difficult  to distinguish  from 
the bias of technical  change.  In response  to these  comments,  as well as to 
Brainard's,  Nordhaus  reported  that he had done some sensitivity  analysis 
on the elasticity  of substitution  between  capital  and  labor.  For example,  he 
tested  whether  longer  lags would affect  the results.  For most alternatives, 
there  was little change  in the estimated  coefficients,  although  the standard 
errors  were  sometimes  somewhat  larger. 
The Nordhaus  finding of a profit plunge elicited a lively discussion. 
Gordon  believed  it important  to extend  Nordhaus'  analysis  to the prewar 
period.  The real puzzle  was why profits  had been so high in 1948  relative 
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in  1948 was usually attributed  to scarce capacity.  However, the ratio 
between  the rate of return  and the cost of capital  was about the same in 
1948  as in 1974,  so this simple  explanation  did not seem adequate. 
Gordon doubted that the risk-premium  thesis would explain  the be- 
havior of profits  in the 1920s,  when the perceived  risks were great but 
profit  margins  were  quite  low. William  Poole suggested  that one measure 
of the risk premium  for a given period  would be the ratio between  the 
yields on low- and on high-grade  bonds, with their different  risks of 
default. The differential  varied over the business cycle in response  to 
investors'  fears about defaults.  Nordhaus  agreed  that Poole's suggestion 
was a good one. 
Michael  Lovell  felt it was important  to test  the  sensitivity  of Nordhaus' 
results to alternative  structural  specifications.  For example,  Nordhaus' 
equation  for  normal  output  follows  from  Muth's  concept  of adaptive  expec- 
tations,  and Lovell  suggested  trying  Nerlove's  concept  of rational  expec- 
tations  to see if the results  hold up. Nordhaus  replied  that he thought  the 
possibilities  were  more  or  less  covered  by his taking  Greenspan's  suggestion 
to substitute  utilization  rates  for a projection  of normal  output.  Lovell  also 
wondered  whether  Nordhaus'  "businessman's  convention"  with  regard  to 
inventory  accounting  could properly  govern  business  decisions.  If firms 
interpret  capital  gains  on inventories  as profits,  they  may  find  over  a period 
of time that the business  cannot  replenish  itself. 
Several  panel members  queried  the lack of a role for price controls 
in the Nordhaus  profits  story. Price  equations  estimated  by others  found 
substantial  residuals  starting  in the fourth quarter  of 1971, suggesting  a 
squeeze of prices relative  to costs beginning  at that time. Gordon at- 
tributed  the discrepancy  to Nordhaus'  practice  of constraining  the elastic- 
ity of price to standard  labor cost to unity. Nordhaus'  equation also 
ignored  the effect  of actual  productivity  and labor costs on prices,  which 
in Gordon's  past work  accounted  for about  20 percent  of price  increases. 
Nordhaus  noted that his IVA illusion  showed  up about the same  time as 
price controls,  so that it was difficult  to determine  which of the two was 
really  the villain. 
Hall pointed  out that with Nordhaus'  finding  of a gap of only about 5 
percent  between  prices  and  total  costs,  price  controls  would  run  a consider- 
able risk of causing  shortages.  Nordhaus  remarked  that the 5 percent  gap 
applied  to long-run  costs. Short-run  marginal  costs would  be much  lower, 
so that it would  take some  time for a price  squeeze  to cause  shortages. 